专属管辖条款在新加坡上诉法院的适用（中英双语）

诸多国际商事合同约定了专属管辖条款，即双方同意将争议提交某特定法院管辖。专属管辖条款的商业重要性在于明确了双方诉讼地。一般来说，新加坡法院会承认和执行专属管辖条款，认可的途径之一是针对违反外国法院专属管辖条款的情形，中止申请人提起的诉讼。所谓“中止诉讼”，就是说，新加坡法院可以暂停诉讼程序，要求当事人在遵守某些条件的前提下，到具有管辖权的外国法院去处理其纠纷，待外国法院审理完毕，再终结新加坡诉讼程序（在某些特殊情况下，新加坡法院的诉讼程序也可以恢复）。
在某些案例中，在缺乏真实抗辩事由的情况下，被诉的商事主体可能会援引专属管辖条款，申请中止诉讼，迫使起诉方在专属管辖条款中约定的外国管辖法院提起诉讼，给起诉方增加额外成本，延缓诉讼进程。两方的观点分别会是：
(a)专属管辖条款体现了当事人意思自治原则，应当得到尊重；
(b)在实际上不应有争议的情况下，被告仅为妨碍原告而滥用专属管辖条款，这有违司法公正和效率原则。
在Jian He[1999] 3 SLR(R) 432一案（“Jian He案”）中，新加坡上诉法院（“上诉法院”）更多地采用第二种观点解决了纠纷。该案涉及中国法院专属管辖条款。上诉法院认为被告缺乏真实抗辩事由，构成法院拒绝中止诉讼 “强有力的理由”。上诉法院在其后审理的众多案件中秉承了Jian He案的判决，包括Hung Vuong2[2000]2 SLR(R) 11 (“Hung Vuong 2案”)、“Golden Shore Transportation Pte Ltd v UCO Bank[2004] 1 SLR(R) 6 (“GoldenShore案”)”以及Hyundai Fortune [2004] 4SLR(R) 548案中。
然而，在今年10月判决的Vinmar Overseas (Singapore) Pte Ltd v PTTInternational Trading Pte Ltd[2018] SGCA 65一案（“Vinmar案”）中，上诉法院改变了法律，与一直贯彻的JianHe案精神背道而驰。同时，该案也阐明了基于外国法院专属管辖条款中止诉讼的法律适用环境。
Vinmar案判决要点
鉴于案件事实对理解判决无足轻重，故不在此赘述。上诉法院在Vinmar案中核心观点归纳如下：
(a)证明存在现行有效的专属管辖条款，从而中止诉讼的标准是“有可争议的理据”（goodarguable case）。从这个角度来说，上诉法院明确了申请人仅需具有“庭前证据可以体现的争议，并对专属管辖条款的存在和适用进行论证”。上诉法院没有对“有可争议的理据”进行严格界定。上诉法院没有接受Wller LJ对CanadaTrust Co and Others v Stolzenberg and Others (No 2) [1998]1 WLR 547at 555案所作的判决当中采用的更加严格的举证标准，即申请人必须对专属管辖条款的现行有效性进行“更好的理据”（betterarguable case）。
(b)上诉法院判决在Vinmar案中判决适用专属管辖条款，认为此前双方的行为均并入了专属管辖条款（双方或其关联方已订立了其他4份合同，含有类似的英国法院专属管辖条款）。
(c)通过否定Jian He案判决，上诉法院认为：在根据专属管辖条款进行中止申请时，判断是否中止诉讼与是否存在实质抗辩依据基本无关，没有实质抗辩依据并不会构成“强有力的理由”而导致法院拒绝中止诉讼。
(d)上诉法院认可：若申请人滥用程序，则对中止请求予以拒绝。 但是，上诉法院给出的案例表明滥用程序仅在例外情形下适用。因此，上诉法院援引了被告明确承认责任和数额、但仅以不能支付为由寻求中止诉讼的情况。上诉法院给出的另一个例证是提出中止诉讼的申请人在约定的管辖地发动媒体宣传，诽谤原告，妨碍公平审判。
(e)上诉法院认可：若中止诉讼可能导致司法不公时，可予以拒绝。例如，若法院在争议发生时已被解散或因管辖地爆发战争，实际上无法对争议进行审判。此外，若极其困难或不便，中止诉讼会导致原告无法获得司法救济，则适用例外情形。但是，管辖地司法体系极度拖沓，并不足以构成司法不公。
(f)上诉法院未解决以下问题：若提单或原告无法进行协商的其他格式合同中包含专属管辖条款时，是否适用相同原则？但值得注意的是，上诉法院表达出一种初步倾向：即使在这种情况下，也应对专属管辖条款一视同仁。
结论
在进行磋商时，商事主体应关注上诉法院最新判决以及潜在专属管辖纠纷的处理。专属管辖条款在提单和格式条款中仍随处可见，依据上诉法院的意见，可能会采用相同原则对其进行处理。
Singapore Court of Appeal Establishes Law on Exclusive Jurisdiction Clauses
Introduction
Many international commercial contracts contain exclusive jurisdictionclauses (“EJCs”) through which parties agree to refer disputes between them tobe determined by Courts of a specified forum. EJCs serve an important commercialfunction: they provide certainty to parties as to where to litigate. Generally,the Singapore Courts will recognise and enforce EJCs. One way in which theSingapore Courts give effect to EJCs is by staying proceedings commenced byclaimants in breach of EJCs in favour of a foreign jurisdictions.
In certain cases, a commercial party defending a claim by, to which ithas no real defence, may use the EJC try to force the claiming party to bringits claim in the foreign jurisdiction prescribed by the EJC. This may cause theclaiming party to have to incur unnecessary additional costs and delay inbringing its claim. In these cases, there is a tension between two competingconsiderations:
(a) Party autonomy embodiedin the agreement on the forum for dispute resolution in the EJC; and
(b) What is, at least onone view, the abusive behaviour of the defendant in utilising the EJC simply topenalise the claimant in a case where there really ought to be nothing todispute at all. This arguably goes against the proper and efficientadministration of justice.
In the case of The Jian He [1999] 3 SLR(R) 432 (“Jian He”),the Singapore Court of Appeal resolved this tension by giving greater weight tothe second consideration. That case involved an EJC in favour of the Chinesecourts. In that case, the Singapore Court of Appeal held that the defendant’slack of a genuine defence constituted “strong cause” justifying a refusal bythe Court to stay proceedings. This holding in Jian He was thereafterconsistently followed and/or approved in numerous Singapore Court of Appealcases thereafter, including in The Hung Vuong 2 [2000] 2 SLR(R) 11 (“HungVuong 2”), Golden Shore Transportation Pte Ltd v UCO Bank [2004] 1SLR(R) 6 (“Golden Shore”), and The Hyundai Fortune [2004] 4SLR(R) 548.
However, in the recent case of Vinmar Overseas (Singapore) Pte Ltd vPTT International Trading Pte Ltd [2018] SGCA 65 (the “Vinmar case”)decided in October this year, the Singapore Court of Appeal has now changed thelaw, departing from the long-standing position in the Jian He line ofcases. It has also clarified some aspects of the law surrounding applicationsfor stay on the basis of EJCs in favour of foreign jurisdictions.
Key Holdings
As the facts of the case are immaterial to understanding the holdings,we do not refer to them in this article. The key points of the Court ofAppeal’s decision in the Vinmar case are summarised below:
(a) The standard of proofwhich in showing that there is an applicable EJC, to justify a stay, is that ofthe “good arguable case”. In this regard, the Court of Appeal clarifiedthat an applicant just needs to have the “better of the argument, on theevidence before the court, that the agreement exists and applies to the dispute”.The Court of Appeal rejected the more stringent formulation of the “goodarguable case” test, derived from Wller LJ’s judgment in Canada Trust Coand Others v Stolzenberg and Others (No 2) [1998] 1 WLR 547 at 555, thatthe applicant must have the “much better argument” that an applicableEJC exists.
(b) The Court of Appeal, inholding that such an EJC applied in the Vinmar case, found that such aEJC had been incorporated by previous conduct (i.e. on the basis that theparties, or their related companies, had entered four other contracts with asimilar EJC in favour of the English Courts).
(c) Overturning thedecision in Jian He, the Court of Appeal held that, in deciding whetherto grant a stay under an EJC stay application, the merits of a defence are essentiallyirrelevant, and a lack of merits could not constitute “strong cause” torefuse a stay.
(d) The Court of Appealrecognised that a stay may still be refused where the applicant is acting inabuse of process. However, the examples given by the Court of Appealdemonstrate that abuse of process would only come into play in very exceptionalcases. Thus, the Court of Appeal referred to cases where the defendant hasclearly admitted to the claim as regards both liability and quantum but seeks astay for no reason other than its inability to pay. Another example givenby the Court of Appeal is a case where the applicant for the stay had started amedia campaign in the agreed forum to malign the plaintiff, thus underminingthe prospects of a fair trial.
(e) The Court of Appealalso recognised that a stay may be refused where it may cause a denial ofjustice. This might be the case for example if the court had been dissolved bythe time the dispute arose or was not realistically available to determine thedispute because war had broken out in the jurisdiction. Alternatively, theexception might apply where it would be so overwhelmingly difficult orinconvenient that a stay would effectively deny the plaintiff access tojustice. However, notorious delay in the judicial system of the agreed forumwould generally not suffice in and of itself to constitute a denial of justice.
(f) The Court of Appealleft open the question as to whether the same principles should govern EJCswhere they are contained in bills of lading or other standard form contractswhich the plaintiff is notallowed to negotiate. (It should be noted,however, that the Court of Appeal, did express a tentative preference for theposition that there should be no difference in treatment of EJCs, even in thosecircumstances).
Conclusion
Commercial parties negotiatingcontracts should take note of this recent ruling by the Court of Appeal and bemindful of the operation of EJC clauses potential disputes. Whilst theoperation of the rule remains to be seen on bills of lading and standard formcontracts, it appears likely based on the Court of Appeal’s comments that thesame principles will apply.