国家发改委全文公布“高通案”行政处罚决定书（Bilingual Version）

2015年3月2日，在官方公告相关消息近三周之后，国家发改委全文公布了“高通案”的行政处罚决定书（以下简称“《决定》”）。《决定》落款显示其作出时间为2015年2月9日，即官方公告的前一日。我们理解，推迟公布《决定》的一个重要原因可能是发改委需要一定的时间删除其中有关公司的商业秘密信息。
After nearly three weeks since the press release, NDRC released the complete Administrative Sanction Decision for the Qualcomm case (“Decision”) on March 2, 2015. The Decision shows that it was issued on February 9, 2015, one day before the press release. We understand that one major reason for postponing the Decision’s release is probably that NDRC took some time to redact the confidential commercial information of the companies concerned.
由于知识产权滥用案件的相对复杂性，各国反垄断执法机构在处理该类案件时往往十分谨慎。尽管与欧盟委员会等其他反垄断执法机构所公布的类似文件相比，《决定》的篇幅并不长，但发改委在《决定》中通篇对若干关键问题展开了分析，这对未来处理类似案件中的市场界定、支配地位认定、滥用行为判定和处罚金额的决定等问题都具有重要的参考意义。
Due to the relatively complicated nature of the IP abuse cases, the competition authorities tend to be very cautious in handling such type of cases. Although the length of the Decision is not comparable with those of other competition authorities such as the European Commission, NDRC has extensively discussed the relevant key points throughout the text of the Decision, which would provide some useful references for similar cases in terms of market definition, assessment of dominance, determination of abusive behaviors, and imposition of penalties.
市场界定 Market Definition
作为认定市场支配地位的第一步，发改委通过替代分析方法将相关市场界定为相对较窄的市场。对于标准必要专利，发改委采取了与“华为诉IDC（交互数字公司）案”的一审和二审法院相同的观点，即每一项标准必要专利许可均单独构成一个独立的相关产品市场。对于基带芯片，发改委认为可以根据不同的技术标准，进一步细化为CDMA、WCDMA和LTE三个基带芯片市场。尽管《决定》从需求和供给两方面对价格变动的影响进行了充分考察，但其并未明确是否将SSNIP测试法用于了本次界定。此外，发改委在本案中体现的对于芯片产品市场进行偏窄界定的趋势，与商务部在经营者集中审查中的相关做法具有一致性。
As a first step of assessment of market dominance, NDRC defined the relevant markets in a relatively narrow way by substitutability analysis. With respect to standard essential patents (“SEPs”), NDRC has adopted the same position as that taken by the trial and appellate courts in the Huawei v. IDC case in China, i.e. license of each SEP can be deemed as an independent product market. As to the baseband chips, NDRC has found that it can be further segmented into CDMA, WCDMA and LTE by different technology standards. It is not expressly held whether the SSNIP test was also applied in this definition, though the effects of price change are appropriately considered both from the demand and the supply dimensions. Moreover, the tendency of a narrow definition of chip products indicated by NDRC is also in line with what MOFCOM has showed in its merger control reviews.
支配地位认定 Assessment of Dominance
根据《反垄断法》第17条，市场支配地位是指“经营者在相关市场内具有能够控制商品价格、数量或者其他交易条件，或者能够阻碍、影响其他经营者进入相关市场能力的市场地位”。市场份额是判断经营者是否具有支配地位的一个常用指标。根据《反垄断法》第19条，如果一个经营者在相关市场的市场份额达到50%，则会被推定为具有支配地位。然而，若有充分的相反证据，该推定可被推翻。除市场份额外，认定经营者市场支配地位的其他因素包括：（1）其控制销售市场或原材料采购市场的能力；（2）财力和技术条件；（3）其他经营者对该经营者在交易上的依赖程度；（4）其他经营者进入相关市场的难易程度等。
Under Article 17 of the AML, a market dominant position is defined as “a market position of an operator to control the price, output or other trading conditions on the relevant market or to prevent or affect the entry of the relevant market by other operators.” Market share is an often-used indicator of a market dominant position. Under Article 19 of the AML, if a company’s market share in the relevant market reaches 50%, it will then be presumed with a dominant position. However, such a presumption is rebuttable with adequate evidence to the contrary. Apart from market share, other factors for assessing the market power of a company include: (1) its ability to control the sales or inputs market; (2) its financial and technical capabilities; (3) the extent to which other companies will depend on the company for transactions; and (4) barrier to entry, etc.
在《决定》中，发改委并未简单地根据市场份额数据分析高通在相关市场中的地位，而是对前述其他因素进行了充分考察，包括在高通被认为具有100%市场份额的各标准必要专利许可市场。
In the Decision, NDRC did not solely rely on the market share data to evaluate Qualcomm’s market power. Instead, the authority has fully considered the afore-mentioned factors, even in each SEP license market where Qualcomm is deemed as occupying a 100% market share.
值得注意的是，针对基带芯片的市场份额计算，发改委采用的是基于销售额的计算方法，而高通方面则辩称，根据销售量计算的市场份额要低得多，但其观点未被发改委采纳。《决定》进一步指出“更高的平均售价进一步证明了当事人…具有一定的支配能力”。为更清晰表达此句中的观点，我们认为或许可以表述为“有能力在一个较长期间内维持更高的平均售价是具有支配地位的一个表现”。
It is noteworthy that, as to baseband chips, the market shares quoted by NDRC are calculated by the sales value which was quite significant and Qualcomm argued that its market share calculated by the sales volume would be much lower. This argument was not accepted by NDRC, which further held in the Decision that “the higher average price of Qualcomm is also an indicator of certain market dominance.” We understand that the rationale would be more clear if it is expressed or explained in a way that “the ability to maintain a higher average price in a long period could be an indicator of market power.”
滥用行为判定 Determination of Abusive Behaviors
根据发改委的认定，高通的有关滥用行为包括：对标准必要专利收取不公平的高价许可费、没有正当理由搭售非标准必要专利，以及在基带芯片销售中附加不合理交易条件。
The abusive behaviors of Qualcomm as found by NDRC include charging unfairly high royalty fees in the SEPs markets, tying the SEPs with the non-SEPs and imposing unreasonable trading conditions in the baseband chip market.
对于何为“不公平的高价”专利许可费，不同于“华为诉IDC案”，发改委并未通过比较对不同被许可人收取的许可费的方式对此进行解释，而是通过对过期的标准必要专利收费、强制性的免费反向许可、以及不合理的专利费计算基础等事实予以证明。《决定》中的分析并未涉及复杂的数学，大部分属于定性分析。
As to unfairly high royalty fees, unlike the Huawei v. IDC case, NDRC did not explain “unfairly high” by comparing the fees charged on different licensees. Instead, according to the authority, “unfairly high” is indicated by charging royalty fees for outdated SEPs, compulsory free cross-license and an unreasonable calculation basis. No complicated math is adopted in the Decision and most analysis is conducted qualitatively.
此外，发改委将在标准必要专利许可中搭售非标准必要专利的行为视为滥用行为，这与“华为诉IDC案”审理法院的认定相一致。发改委还将高通以芯片购买者签订有关许可协议作为销售基带芯片的条件的行为认定为滥用行为。
Moreover, NDRC deems tying SEPs license with non-SEPs as abusive, which is consistent with the Huawei v. IDC courts. NDRC also deems abusive Qualcomm’s conditioning the sale of baseband chips on the chip customers signing a license agreement.
《决定》显示，尽管高通提出了行为存在正当理由方面的多项抗辩，但是发改委均未予采纳。这也表明，正当理由取决于反垄断执法机构的裁量且不易证明。
The Decision shows that Qualcomm has raised various arguments as justifications but NDRC did not accept them. It tells us that any justifications would be subject to the discretion of the antitrust agencies and would not be easy to prove.
处罚金额的决定 Imposition of Penalties
发改委责令高通从多个方面停止违法行为，包括向被许可人提供专利清单和调整计算专利许可费的基础等。高通提出的整改方案似乎为如何实施发改委的决定提供了更加详细的内容。此外，发改委以高通2013年在中国的总销售额为基础计算出罚金，这与其处理的其他案件有所不同。在此前案例中，发改委计算罚金的基础通常是上一财务年度该公司的相关产品在中国市场的销售额。尽管如此，要说罚金计算规则已完全改变为时尚早，但是我们应当对罚金计算基础可能会变化这一情况予以充分关注。
NDRC ordered Qualcomm to cease the illegal behaviors in several aspects, for instance, providing licensees with a patent list and adjusting the calculation basis for royalty fees. It seems that Qualcomm’s rectification plan sets out detailed rules for implementing the NDRC order. In addition, NDRC has calculated the fines on the basis of Qualcomm’s total turnover in China in 2013, which appears differenct from other NDRC cases. In the previous cases, NDRC's basis for fine calculation seemed to be a company's turnover of the relevant products in the China market for the last fiscal year. With this said, it may still be too early to say that the principle has been entirely changed, but the calculation basis may become a variable that we should keep our eyes on.
综上，《决定》似乎表明各有关机关（如发改委、商务部和法院）之间对本案所涉及的多项反垄断问题的立场的一致性和互动性有所加强。尽管《决定》未能提供更加详尽的分析，我们仍然认为其将对滥用知识产权排除、限制竞争案件产生重要的指导作用。
In summary, the Decision seems to demonstrate more consistency and interaction among different relevant authorities (e.g. NDRC, MOFCOM, and the courts) with regard to the antitrust issues as involved in this case. Although more detailed analysis is not presented in the Decision, we believe that it would provide very useful guidance for future cases of IP abuse in restraint of competition.