雇主替代责任(vicarious liability): 金融消费者保护的可能路径

摘要
“河南村镇银行事件”曝光后, 银行工作人员损害储户利益的法律保护问题再次进入了公众视野。长期以来, 此类案件在我国以表见代理或者职务代理的审理思路为主流, 很少关注雇主替代责任。这与普通法以雇主替代责任为主流的审理思路形成了鲜明对比。普通法下, 雇主替代责任以紧密联系标准作为判断责任是否成立的准绳。紧密联系标准会考虑诸多因素, 其中表见代理为考虑因素之一。在欺诈侵权情况下, 紧密联系标准与表见代理会产生部分重合, 关键在于判断第三人的信赖是否合理。借鉴比较法经验, 在加强金融消费者保护的背景下, 建议适当强化雇主替代责任的适用, 在第三人信赖的判断上适当容忍储户的轻微过错, 或者将储户的过错与雇主的过错进行比较作为责任是否成立的考虑因素。通过赋予储户提起备位请求的权利, 同时提出雇主替代责任和表见代理, 以实现储户的全面救济。
一直以来, 我国银行工作人员损害储户利益的案件中, 以表见代理或者职务代理的审理思路为主流, 法院较少关注侵权法下的雇主替代责任(vicarious liability)。[1]这与普通法下在类似案件中以雇主替代责任为主流的审理思路形成了鲜明对比。
特别是, 2023年1月9日, 最高人民法院对十三届全国人大五次会议第4254号建议的答复意见进一步彰显了表见代理在此类案件审理思路中的主流地位。[2]
表见代理强调储户需善意无过失, 即储户需要尽到一定的注意义务, 注意义务的程度不同决定了储户能否获得救济。一旦法院认定储户存在轻过失不构成善意, 储户的利益将很难获得保护。这一定程度上与保护金融消费者的政策立场相背离。
此外, 最高人民法院刘贵祥大法官在2023年1月10日召开的全国法院金融审判工作会议上特别强调保护金融消费者, “金融审判应当站稳人民立场, 以保护金融消费者和中小投资者合法权益为己任, 让人民群众能够公平享受金融服务, 切实守护好人民群众的‘钱袋子’。”[3]
我们认为, 基于金融消费者保护的政策立场, 可以适当强化雇主替代责任在银行工作人员损害储户利益案件中的适用, 通过赋予储户提起备位请求的权利, 在此类案件中丰富请求权基础, 实现储户的全面救济。
值得注意的是, 本文结论是基于金融消费者保护背景下所作出的, 在非金融消费者保护背景下如何看待中国法下的雇主替代责任和表见代理等制度, 有其特定的价值衡量标准, 不可一概而论。
以下, 我们将通过梳理不同法域下(主要是普通法下)雇主替代责任判断标准的演变来分析我国银行工作人员损害储户利益案件中强化雇主替代责任适用的可能性。
一、普通法下的雇主替代责任
普通法的雇主替代责任可以追溯到德国法和罗马法[4], 其判断标准随着时代发展而不断进步与完善。
以普通法的代表英国法为例, 在十七世纪以前, 英国采取的是命令和同意理论(command and consent theory), 即除非雇主明确命令或者同意雇员采取不法行为, 否则雇主不为雇员的行为承担责任。[5]这一理论在十七世纪初依然得以适用。例如, 在Waltham v. Mulgar案中, Popham法官认为, 雇主应当对雇员应其要求而实施的不法行为承担责任。[6]
但是, 命令和同意理论在十七世纪末受到了诸多质疑, 理由在于: 随着企业规模的扩大, 雇主与雇员之间的关系开始疏远, 因此要求雇主对于雇员的特定行为进行授权是不现实的。[7]
由此, 在Turberville v. Stampe案中, Holt法官认为, 即便雇员并非基于雇主的明确命令而实施了不法行为, 如果雇员是为了雇主的利益(being for his master’s benefit), 则雇主应当对雇员的行为承担责任。[8] Turberville v. Stampe案的意义在于: 第一, 明确否定“命令或同意”系雇主替代责任的构成要件; 第二, 该案系英国判例法中以雇员的行为是为了雇主的利益判决雇主承担替代责任的第一个案例。[9]此后, William v. Jones案[10]、Stone v. Cartwright案[11]、Duncan v. Findlater案[12]等案件也将“为了雇主的利益”作为判断雇主替代责任成立与否的标准。
不过, 由于在判断“为了雇主的利益”时应当采主观标准(即雇员认为其系为雇主利益行事)还是客观标准(即理性之人认为雇员系为雇主利益行事)存在争议, 英国法意识到“为了雇主的利益行事”不足以确定替代责任的边界, 需要辅以雇佣范围理论(scope of employment doctrine or the course of employment doctrine)。 [13]
普通法下雇佣范围理论的判断标准来源于Salmond和Heuston在其侵权法著作中的观点, 即Salmond标准(Salmond test), “雇主对其雇员的不法行为不承担责任, 除非该行为是雇员在执行雇佣活动中所实施的。以下情形之一属于执行雇佣活动: (1)实施的不法行为已经得到雇主的授权; (2)以不法的且未得到授权的行为模式实施已经得到雇主授权的行为。” [14]Salmond标准在二十世纪得以广泛适用。
进入二十一世纪后, 英国法院对于Salmond标准是否应当继续存续产生了争论, 理由在于: Salmond标准无法涵盖故意侵权行为, 将严重的违法犯罪行为强行解释为属于“未得到授权的行为模式”是对Salmond标准的歪曲解释。[15]因此, 需要有新的判断标准将故意侵权行为纳入雇主替代责任的范畴内。
在这一背景下, 紧密联系标准(close connection test)应运而生。在Lister v. Helsey Hall Ltd案[16]中, 英国上议院提出了“紧密联系标准”作为判断雇主替代责任的新标准, 即雇员的侵权行为与其雇佣活动联系紧密, 从而使雇主承担替代责任是公平公正的。[17]
(一) 紧密联系标准(Close Connection Test)的判断因素
紧密联系标准的具体判断方法在各个司法管辖区仍存在细微差别。一种是以加拿大为代表的判断路径, 即紧密联系的建立主要取决于雇主是否增加(enhance)了实施不法行为的风险(risk)及其程度; [18]另一种是以英国为代表的判断路径, 即紧密联系的建立取决于雇员的不法行为和雇主责任之间的联系, 而不要求雇主提升了雇员侵权的风险。[19]无论哪种判断路径, 紧密联系标准核心关注三个方面: 案件的事实、雇员的目的以及受害者补偿[20], 法官需要根据个案的特定事实和先例作出价值判断[21]。
通过总结判例, 可以发现普通法下紧密联系标准通常考察的因素如下:
(1) 雇员行为是否过于异常(unusual)或令人震惊(startling)以及雇主是否能够预见(foreseeable)损害结果的发生
美国法院在处理银行雇员欺诈储户的纠纷案件时, 往往通过雇主替代责任来解决, 其判断的重要标准是: 雇员的行为是否过于异常以及雇主能否合理预见雇员行为可能造成的损害后果。
例如, 在Olson v. Tri-County State Bank案(“Olson案”)中, 美国南达科他州最高法院认为, 银行是否需要对雇员的行为承担责任, 取决于雇员的雇佣活动与实际造成损害的行为之间的联系(nexus)。如果这种联系足以使银行预见到雇员行为所造成的损害后果, 则银行应当承担责任。换言之, 如果雇佣活动使得雇员的欺诈行为并不过于异常或令人震惊, 且将因该欺诈行为而造成的损失涵盖在银行的业务成本中也并非不公平, 则银行应当对此承担责任。[22]
(2) 雇员行为的目的(purpose)
在侵害行为发生时, 即便雇员的行为是错误的或者过度的, 雇员的行为是否可以被合理地认为是为了雇主的利益(in the interests of the employer), 还是只是追求个人利益(pursuing some private end)。[23]
例如, 在Riggan v. Glass案件中, Glass虚增了Riggan在银行的贷款, 并将收益存入其个人账户。美国爱荷华州上诉法院认为, 即便雇员的行为超出了雇主实际授权的范围, 如果该行为对于实现雇佣目的(purpose of the employment)而言是必须的, 且雇员正是为了实现雇佣目的才实施了该行为, 则雇员的行为应视为属于雇佣范围内的行为。[24]本案有充分的证据表明Glass系在其雇佣范围内行事。Glass是银行的首席执行官、行长以及贷款部门的主管, 他虚增贷款并控制收益流向的目的之一是制造银行没有不良贷款, 而且利润极高的假象。[25]
不过, 即便雇员系为了自己利益行事, 雇主也可能承担替代责任。例如, 在前述Olson案中, 美国南达科他州最高法院认为, 不能仅以雇员的行为只是为了个人利益就让雇主免于对雇员的欺诈行为承担责任。[26]
(3) 雇员的工作性质(nature)和雇员的职位(position)
在Mohamud v. WM Morrison Supermarkets plc案中, 英国最高法院指出, 判断紧密联系是否建立, 应考虑两个要素。第一, 雇主授权雇员处理的事务, 即雇员的工作性质(nature); 第二, 雇员的职位(position)与不法行为之间的紧密联系。[27]
(4) 其他因素
除此之外, 法院会考量的因素包括但不限于:
第一, 雇员执行雇佣活动的地点是在工作场所(area where he would have worked)还是私人空间, 是在工作时间还是非工作时间(off-duty);[28]
第二, 加害人是否身着用人单位的服装(wearing of uniforms);[29]
第三, 受害者的脆弱地位(vulnerability)[30], 如老人、儿童等。
(二) 雇员欺诈情形下的雇主替代责任
紧密联系标准原则上可适用于所有侵权类型。但是, 在雇员欺诈(employee fraud)的情景下, 普通法对于判断雇主替代责任应当适用通常的紧密联系标准(ordinary close connection test), 还是适用特殊的雇佣范围标准(special course of employment test), 即表见代理标准(apparent or ostensible authority test)有所分歧。
表见代理标准是一种只适用于欺诈侵权的更严格的判断标准[31], 即雇主替代责任的成立与否, 不在于雇员是否在执行雇佣活动, 而在于雇员的行为是否在其实际授权(actual authority)或表面授权(ostensible authority)的范围内。[32]雇员在其授权范围内行事, 可以证成欺诈行为与雇佣活动之间存在紧密联系。[33]
表见代理标准与紧密联系标准的本质区别在于, 法官需要判断受害人的信赖(reliance by the victim)[34], 受害人的信赖必须满足合理性要件(reasonableness)[35]。
(1) 受害人的主观状态为故意
目前普通法达成共识的是, 如果受害人的主观状态是故意(即受害人对于雇员没有授权是明知的), 雇主不应当承担替代责任。
例如, 在Armagas Ltd v. Mundogas SA (The Ocean Frost)案(“Armagas案”)中, 英国最高法院认为, 原告已经知道(had known)Magelessen没有代表被告签署三年租船合同的一般授权, 且被告也没有作出授权Magelessen的陈述, 在这种情况下, 原告不能合理信赖Magelessen拥有签订租船合同的特定授权。[36]
又如, 在香港高等法院原讼法庭近期审理的Luk Wing Yan v. CMB Wing Lung Bank Limited案(“CMB案”)[37] 中, 原告购买了雇员声称的CMB Wing Lung Bank Limited(“招商永隆银行”)(被告)只对其员工提供的内部投资产品, 该产品承诺了极高的投资回报。然而, 原告投资的大部分款项最终转入了雇员的个人账户, 并被雇员私吞。原告起诉请求招商永隆银行赔偿损失。
香港高等法院原讼法庭认为, 本案应适用表见代理标准。本案中, 雇员的行为并不构成表见代理, 理由在于: 原告对于其购买的产品仅对银行内部员工销售是明知(knew)的, 原告不能对雇员销售该产品的行为产生合理信赖。[38]原讼法庭最终认定招商永隆银行不应为雇员的行为承担替代责任。
(2) 受害人的主观状态为过失
在受害人的主观状态为过失的情况下(即受害人的信赖不合理), 普通法判断雇主是否应当承担替代责任的裁判尺度不尽相同。大致可以归纳为如下几种类型:
类型一: 法院只判断雇员是否在其实际授权或表面授权范围内行事, 并未考虑第三人合理信赖这一要件
在Lloyd v. Grace, Smith & Co案中, 律师事务所的管理人员被允许在不受监督的情况下开展房产交易业务, 该员工以公司代表的身份, 诱骗原告出售了两处房产, 该员工的行为完全是为了自己的利益。
英国最高法院认为, 律师事务所应当承担雇主替代责任。理由在于: 其已经获得了公司的表面授权, 即如果代理人在业务过程中实施了欺诈行为, 而这些业务是他被授权或被认为经授权而为了委托人的利益所做, 那么委托人应当承担替代责任。[39]
类型二: 即便受害人客观存在过失, 法院也认定雇主替代责任成立
在Harkness v. Platten案中, 投资人Harkness夫妇起诉其律师Platten失职。事件起因于Harkness夫妇被一位名叫Kantor的贷款专员(loan officer)所骗, Harkness夫妇主张Platten在代理其诉Kantor及Kantor的前后两家雇主Sunset公司和Directors公司(两家均为抵押融资公司)时, 本可以对两家公司主张雇主替代责任(respondeat superior, 即vicarious liability的一种类型)以及表见代理下的相关责任, 却草草与Kantor及两家公司达成了和解。
原告Harkness夫妇被卷入投资骗局的具体经过为, 他们听从贷款专员Kantor的建议, 以其房产作为抵押, 从Sunset公司和Directors公司借款; 然后再以短期高息贷款的方式将这些现金通过Sunset公司和Directors公司借给不同的地产开发商。Kantor声称这些短期高息贷款将由开发商的不动产作为担保(liens)。然而持续投资两年后, 原告Harkness夫妇发现, Kantor伪造了相关贷款文件, 案涉短期高息的贷款并未完成相关担保登记(failed to record liens), 共计近100万美元的贷款无法收回。而事实上, Kantor将原告的投资款占为己有。[40]原告认为, 其律师Platten应当基于表见代理和雇主替代责任, 主张两家公司为Kantor的行为承担相应的赔偿责任。
初审法院及俄勒冈州上诉法院认为, 原告未能证明其对雇员的权限具备合理信赖, 因而无论是表见代理抑或是雇主替代责任均难以证成, 被告采取和解结案的策略并无不当。[41] 初审法院应被告的请求, 下达了该案无需经过陪审团审理而直接驳回原告诉讼请求的裁决。
然而, 俄勒冈州最高法院推翻了上诉法院的判决, 认为原告在向Kantor及Sunset公司和Directors公司追索时的两个诉由(表见代理、雇主替代责任)均基于同一待论证事实, 即融资担保公司赋予了Kantor相应的表见外观。[42]
俄勒冈州最高法院指出, 案涉投资纠纷中, Kantor在工作时间、于公司办公室内接待Harkness夫妇, 且推荐投资计划是Kantor工作职责的一部分, Kantor具备相应的表见外观, 原告的合理信赖存在证成的较高可能性。[43]
俄勒冈州最高法院进一步认为, 当雇主授予雇员执行某些任务的实际权限时, 该实际权限可能会衍生出执行其他相关任务的权限, 使得雇员在执行这些相关任务时也被认定在雇佣范围内行事。[44]在没有合理理由怀疑的情况下, 第三人不需要核实雇员的权限范围。[45]本案中, Kantor是抵押融资公司的贷款专员, 且公司鼓励雇员帮助客户拓展生意, 贷款专员向客户积极推荐投资计划是可预期的。[46]综上所述, 俄勒冈州最高法院倾向于认为, 雇员的表见外观是能够证成的。俄勒冈州最高法院最终将该案发回重审。
该案中, 原告并未核实雇员所称的投资短期高息贷款事项的权限, 且在长达两年的投资里面未主动查询该等贷款如何偿付、是否办理了相应的担保登记, 并且当短期高息贷款到期未偿付时, 原告听信Kantor的建议直接将未付贷款转为新的贷款借给同一借款人。可见, 原告自身存在一定的过失, 但这并未影响法院倾向于支持原告的信赖是合理的。
类型三: 将受害人能够合理信赖雇员具有授权的举证责任分配给受害人或者雇主, 从而影响责任承担
有美国法院认为, 应当由受害人证明自己的信赖是合理的, 即由受害人承担举证责任。
例如, 在Wilder v. JP Morgan Chase Bank案中, JP Morgan Chase Bank(“摩根大通银行”)的业务专员Rutty (business specialist)收受某投资公司负责人的好处费, 由投资公司负责人先接触投资人, 并向投资人推荐项目, 再邀请投资人向Rutty核实该投资公司的资信。虽然事实上, 投资公司才刚刚在摩根大通银行开户, Rutty却告知投资人该投资公司在摩根大通银行的信誉良好。投资人Wilder将投资款支付到投资公司在摩根大通银行的账户的一段时间后才发现其被卷入了庞氏骗局。
原告援引表见代理标准, 向法院起诉主张摩根大通银行应为其雇员Rutty的行为承担替代责任。[47]
美国佛罗里达州南区地方法院认为, 适用表见代理标准时, 构成雇主替代责任需要证明以下要件: (1)被代理人的某些陈述或行为让相对人相信代理人具有为被代理人利益而行事的权限; (2)相对人的信赖是合理的; (3)相对人基于其合理信赖而进行的行为导致了自身利益受损。[48]
在该案中, 原告除了证明Rutty和摩根大通银行的雇佣关系外, 再没有举出其他Rutty为投资公司背书具有表见外观的证据。[49]原告Wilder没有证明他对银行雇员Rutty是为了摩根大通银行的利益而行事的信赖是合理的。[50]摩根大通银行不应为雇员Rutty承担替代责任。
此外, 在前述Armagas案中, 英国最高法院认为, 在雇员声称其具有授权的情况下, 必须有一个其他理由让受害人信赖雇员具有授权。如果受害人完全基于雇员关于其具有授权的陈述而产生信赖, 该信赖不具有合理性。[51]
但是, 这种让受害人举证证明自己的信赖是合理的观点受到了激烈的批评。反对者认为这会给受害人施加过重的义务。具体而言:
英国上诉法院在First Energy (UK) Ltd v. Hungarian International Bank Ltd案中虽然是依据合同法层面的代理制度作出裁判, 但是其认为在小规模企业的重要员工已经声称自己具有授权的情况下, 原告没有必要向小企业的总部进行核实。Nourse法官认为这违背了商业实践和常识。[52]
布里斯托大学Paula Giliker 教授认为, Armagas案中要求受害人核实授权的做法值得商榷, 这种做法也与欺诈侵权下的基本原则相违背, 即: 如果在欺诈侵权中注定有一个败诉者, 雇佣欺诈者并给予其信任的雇主应当是败诉者, 而非受害人。[36]
澳大利亚学者F. Trindade, P. Cane 和M. Lunney明确指出, 法律完全可以确立如下标准, 即: 在雇员声称其具有授权的情况下, 除非有充分理由怀疑该等陈述是虚假的, 否则受害人的信赖具有合理性。[54]
在前述CMB案中, 香港高等法院原讼法庭虽然认为, 原告(受害人)必须证明, 其事实上信赖了雇员声称的其在雇主实际授权或表面授权范围内行事[55] , 但是, 即使原告有合理的怀疑理由, 法庭也并不要求受害者对交易的合法性进行调查(make enquiries)。[56]
从以上司法案例和学者观点来看, 即便认为雇主替代责任需要满足“受害人具有合理信赖”的要件, 也不应当将举证责任分配给受害人。质言之, 除非雇主举证证明存在受害人合理怀疑雇员不具有授权的情形, 否则应当推定受害人可以合理信赖雇员关于其具有授权的陈述。
类型四: 比较受害人和雇主的过错大小, 以作为雇主替代责任成立的考虑因素
新加坡法院确立了一个判断雇主替代责任的标准, 即受害人不存在过错(without fault)或者受害人的过错比侵权人或雇主小(less at fault than the blameworthy party and/or the ultimate defendant)。
简言之, 即便受害人存在过错, 如果受害人的过错比雇主小, 那么在满足其他要件的情况下(如special relationship和close connection), 雇主应当承担替代责任。
以Ong Han Ling and another v. American International Assurance Co Ltd and others案为例, 保险公司(被告)的保险代理人Sally向原告虚构了保险产品, Sally使用原告购买该虚构产品的款项, 购买了保险公司的其他产品。在原告发现保单上的产品名称错误时, Sally告知是由于计算机错误地将其他人购买的产品登记在了原告名下。Sally诱骗原告将“登记错误”的保单交出, 并最终成功从保险公司处将原告的资金私吞了。原告要求保险公司赔偿其损失。
保险公司主张, 本案并不满足替代责任成立的前提条件, 即原告的过错必须比侵权人(Sally)和/或雇主的小。本案中, 与保险公司相比, 原告的过错更大(more at fault)。[57]
新加坡高等法院认为, Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v. Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd and another案(“Skandinaviska案”)并没有确立相对过错(relative fault)是雇主替代责任成立的前提条件, 只是承认在受害人过错比侵权人和被告更大时, 将补偿受害人作为施加替代责任的正当化理由, 这一政策考量的道德价值降低了。相对过错是成立替代责任的考量因素之一, 但非决定性因素。[58]
新加坡高等法院进一步指出, 本案中, 原告的过错比被告小[59] , Sally作为保险代理人, 她的欺诈行为与她和保险公司的代理关系之间存在紧密联系。理由在于: 第一, 保险公司的业务模式让Sally有机会滥用其保险代理人的职能; 第二, Sally的行为直接导致原告付款购买了虚构的保险产品, Sally的行为符合保险公司通过保险代理人销售保险的商业目的; 第三, Sally的行为与保险公司希望打造的保险代理人和高净值保险消费者之间建立密切联系的商业模式有关。[60]因此, 法院判决保险公司承担雇主替代责任。
不过, 新加坡法院也认为, 如果雇主不存在过错, 相反受害人存在重大过失, 则此时让雇主承担替代责任是不公平的。
以Rohini D/O Balasubramaniam v. HSR International Realtors Pte Ltd案为例, 上诉人(一审原告)应房地产销售人员的要求, 向销售人员开出空白支票, 委托其进行房地产交易。然而, 销售人员将资金挪为己用。上诉人要求包括HSR(销售人员代表的公司)在内的多个主体承担赔偿责任。
新加坡高等法院认为, 本案中, 上诉人存在重大过失, 其损失完全系因自己行为导致的。理由在于: 上诉人在2007年购买房产并签署服务费协议时已经注意到(being aware), 其不应当向HSR的销售人员提供空白支票, 然而她还是提供了。因此, 正是上诉人的行为给了销售人员实施欺诈行为的机会, 此时要求雇主承担替代责任是不公平的。 [61]
值得注意的是, 与将相对过错作为成立雇主替代责任判断因素之一的司法观点不同, 有新加坡学者在评述Skandinaviska案时提到, 通常情况下, 受害人是否不够谨慎(carelessness)与判断雇主替代责任的成立与否无关。只有在雇主因雇员失实陈述而承担替代责任并提出共同过失(contributory negligence)抗辩的情况下, 判断受害人是否不够谨慎才有意义, 因为这样可以减少雇主的责任赔偿数额。[62]
二、强化雇主替代责任在我国银行工作人员损害储户利益案件中的适用
借鉴比较法经验, 在银行工作人员损害储户利益的纠纷中, 雇主替代责任居于主流, 并以紧密联系标准作为判断责任是否成立的准绳。紧密联系标准会考虑诸多因素, 其中雇员的行为是否构成表见代理为考虑因素之一。[63]
特别是, 在欺诈侵权情况下, 紧密联系标准与表见代理会产生部分重合, 关键在于判断第三人的信赖是否合理。
关照我国实践, 无论故意欺诈还是非故意欺诈案件, 表见代理超越了雇主替代责任成为了主流的判断标准, 使得银行工作人员损害储户利益的案件脱离了侵权法的轨道而转入代理法的逻辑之中。而受制于代理人需考察被代理人可归责性(有争议)以及第三人是否善意的要件, 储户利益多得不到保护。
如果能够在此类案件中加强雇主替代责任的适用, 丰富请求权基础, 可能可减轻司法疑难。具言之:
(一) 银行是否有过错不影响雇主替代责任的成立
雇主替代责任规定在《民法典》第1191条第1款, 即“用人单位的工作人员因执行工作任务造成他人损害的, 由用人单位承担侵权责任。用人单位承担侵权责任后, 可以向有故意或者重大过失的工作人员追偿。”该条与原《侵权责任法》第34条保持一致。
最高人民法院在对第1191条的理解与适用中指出, “雇主替代责任是一种无过错责任, 对工作人员因执行工作任务致人损害的, 用人单位本身虽无任何过失, 仍应负赔偿责任, 用人单位不得主张尽到选任、用人的相当注意义务而免责。”[64]
邹海林教授和朱广新教授在此条的评注中亦指出, “雇主替代责任不以过错为责任构成要件, 这符合立法者本意。”[65]
因此, 银行的过错在雇主替代责任中可以不作为一个重点因素考虑。然而, 司法实践中, 法院也并非完全遵循无过错原则。[66]
(二) 雇主替代责任下如何考察第三人(即储户)的信赖
根据比较法经验, 在非欺诈侵权下, 紧密联系标准往往无需考察第三人的信赖。
如果雇员的行为并非过于异常以及雇主能合理预见雇员行为可能造成的损害后果, 或者加害行为的目的可以合理认定为有利于雇主, 或者考察雇员的工作性质、职位或者工作地点、工作时间能够说明雇员的侵权行为与雇佣关系存在内在联系的, 均可以证成雇主替代责任。
在欺诈侵权下, 需要考察第三人的信赖是否合理。如果第三人为故意(明知)的, 第三人的信赖没有合理性。
在第三人为过失的情况下, 尽管有部分案例认为需由第三人证明其信赖的合理性。但是这种观点受到了批判, 更为主流的观点认为只要没有合理怀疑, 应该推定第三人的信赖合理。
新加坡法院的做法也值得参考, 即比较储户的过错与银行过错的大小, 即便储户存有过错, 但是储户过错小于银行过错的, 也应该认为雇主替代责任成立。对于储户的过错可以通过共同过失规则减少银行的赔偿额。
在我国的司法实践中, 以表见代理的标准审查银行是否应该承担责任, 关键在于储户是否善意无过失, 储户为故意、恶意的情形自然得不到保护。有疑问的是, 如果储户为过失, 究竟过失需达到何种程度, 对此并无明确的标准, 也未形成强有力的学说观点。
有的学者主张, 在表见代理的情况下轻过失即构成非善意[67] ; 或认为表见代理下相对人的善意标准应高于同类制度(如善意取得)[68] ; 有的学者指出, 德国通说认为在表见代理上轻过失足以排除善意, 至于是否进一步要求“善意且无轻过失”, 中国司法实践未见相关判决[69] ; 更多学者主张应基于一般理性人标准构建表见代理下第三人的善意标准[70]。
司法实践中, 法官往往注意到储户确有一定的过失, 但是定性为轻过失还是重大过失或者处于中间地带, 难以把握。由于表见代理下第三人善意无过失标准的混乱, 也导致此类案件中判断储户是否善意时法官自由裁量权过大, 同一案情或者类似案情裁判结果各异。
因此, 如果能够借鉴比较法的经验, 强化雇主替代责任的适用, 在第三人信赖的判断上适当容忍第三人的轻微过错, 或者将第三人的过错与雇主的过错进行比较, 可能更有助于说理释法。
我们注意到, 已有中国法院在此方面做出了有益尝试, 即在判断雇主替代责任是否成立之时, 并不考虑相对人的善意或者信赖, 而是重点考察侵权行为与雇佣关系的内在联系, 相对人的过错可基于过失相抵规则扣减雇主的赔偿范围。
例如, 在(2018)沪01民终4186号案件中, 上海市第一中级人民法院根据《侵权责任法》第34条第1款的规定, 认定银行员工虚构项目材料, 对外招揽投资人签订项目合同, 非法吸收公众存款的行为属于职务行为, 银行员工的侵权行为与雇佣关系之间存在内在联系, 银行应承担雇主替代责任。同时, 法院进一步认为投资人也存在一定过错, 应自行承担20%的责任。[71]
(三) 不应过于严苛认定“执行工作任务”或侵权行为与雇佣关系之间的内在联系
雇主替代责任是否成立的另一个重要方面是如何认定“执行工作任务”。
所谓“执行工作任务”, 在两大法系下已日渐趋于一致, 即判断标准在于如何认定雇员的侵权行为与雇佣关系存在紧密联系。
《德国民法典》第831条规定了雇主应该为事务辅助人执行事务时造成的损害承担责任, 即事务辅助人责任(Haftung für den Verrichtungsgehilfen)。
根据评注观点, 所谓执行工作任务, “必须要在任务范围和损害之间存在一个合格的、内部的联系, 而不仅仅是因果关系。”[72]
如何评价所谓的“内在联系”, 评注认为, 通过风险增加原则的目的论标准来归责辅助人的行为是必要的。[73]
辅助人的选择、监督和指导是雇主的责任, 因为他给予辅助人手段并提供机会来侵害第三方的法益, 与受害人不同, 雇主也有能力通过精心的选择、监督、指导和其他经营组织措施来防止损害。因此, 雇主不仅要承担一般经营风险, 而且还要承担用人风险, 即辅助人可能出现疏忽或恶意的危险。他必须为辅助人所有行为的后果负责, 这些辅助人行为是由于承担雇主任务而得以实现或变得更容易实现。[74]
评注列举了不构成雇主替代责任的情形, 即:
第一, 如果侵权行为不属于所委托的任务范围, 辅助人“偶然地接触到被害人的法律权益”[75], 比如, 车主将车交给一名辅助人时, 如果后者开黑车并造成了事故, 所有人将不承担责任。[76]再比如, 在集市上的游乐设施中工作的辅助人与一名儿童接触, 随后将其绑架并最终强奸, 雇主不承担责任。[77]
第二, 不属于雇主控制范围之内的辅助人个人领域的行为, 雇主无法通过内部预防措施来控制。[78]例如, 辅助人在执行任务时与客户建立私人关系, 然后在离职后犯罪, 雇主的责任应被否定。[79]再比如, 在违反业主指示的情况下在卡车驾驶室中搭载路人, 属于归责雇主的风险范畴, 除非司机和乘客以危害雇主的方式勾结, 因为在这种情况下, 受害人知道他所面临的风险, 并不需要通过提起针对雇主的赔偿请求来获得保护。[80]
在我国, 就如何判断雇员是否执行工作任务, 认定标准上有主观说和客观说之分。
主观说以雇主或雇员的主观意思为准, 如果雇员是在雇主指示范围内或主观上为雇主的利益而实施行为, 应认定属于执行工作任务的范围。客观说则以工作人员所从事活动的外在表现为标准, 如果行为在客观上的表现与用人单位指示的工作范围相一致, 即属于执行工作任务。[81]学界和司法实践均采客观说。[82]
最高人民法院在理解与适用中特别强调, “工作人员的行为即使超出职权范围,但只要从行为的客观形式上不能使受害人认识, 仍构成用人单位的行为, 用人单位应当承担责任。” [83]
邹海林教授和朱广新教授认为, 对于利用工作职务给予的机会侵权, 应当区分其属于用人单位营业或事业所蕴含之特别风险, 还是属于与用人单位营业或事业无关的社会一般风险。对于前者, 应认定为“执行工作任务”所致损害, 诸如邮差私拆信件窃取汇款、快递送货员窃取快递物品、剧场衣帽间管理员窃取寄托物品等行为均依赖于特定营业, 应当认定与其职务具有内在关联, 由用人单位承担责任。[84]
程啸教授也指出, “实践中发生的, 加害人身着被告银行的工装、佩戴工作名牌, 在工作时间于银行的营业场所内对受害人实施诈骗行为(如签订虚假合同骗取资金或推销理财产品等)。这种情形下, 就应当认定银行作为用人单位承担用人者责任。但是, 很多法院却以加害人的行为并未取得被告银行的授权或许可, 目的也不是为了被告银行的利益, 否定该行为是执行工作任务的行为。这显然是不妥的, 既不利于保护受害人, 更无法有效地预防和制止此类侵权行为的发生。”[85]
由此可见, 我国法下关于所谓“执行工作任务”的判断标准, 与普通法和大陆法所采取的标准并无本质不同。参考比较法经验和权威学者的观点, 我们认为, 即使雇员的行为非为雇主利益作出, 而是出于实现个人非法目的, 但如果其行为依社会通常认识足以被认为与执行工作任务具有内在联系, 其侵权行为仍应视为雇主的侵权行为。
(四) 允许以备位请求同时提出雇主替代责任和表见代理
尽管雇主替代责任和表见代理均可以作为储户主张权利的请求权基础, 但是受制于我国诉讼法理论以及司法实践明确请求权基础的要求, 储户很难同时将雇主替代责任和表见代理作为请求权基础在法院提出。
为了最大化保护金融消费者的利益, 我们建议, 在此类案件中可以借助备位之诉制度, 允许储户同时提出雇主替代责任和表见代理, 以便于法官审查不同的请求权基础, 保障储户获得全面救济的机会。
我们注意到, 上海市早有此先例, 虽然最后未能成功, 但留下了宝贵的经验。
例如, 在东莞市丸万塑料包装有限公司诉湖石化学贸易(上海)有限公司广州分公司服务合同纠纷案中, 原告在一审中基于表见代理主张权利败诉[86], 二审中又援引雇主替代责任获得胜诉[87], 再审法院指令二审法院重审[88]。二审法院撤销一审判决和二审判决, 发回一审法院重审。[89]
发回重审后, 原告在一审法院以雇主替代责任主张权利, 中间又调整为合同关系, 在法院释明下又调整为雇主替代责任, 最终一审没有支持表见代理和雇主替代责任, 但认为雇主应承担一般侵权责任, 承担30%损失[90]。
上海市高级人民法院在其编写的《<民法典>适用与司法实务》中评价该案时指出, “丸万公司之所以优先选择表见代理作为请求权基础, 是因为一旦认定成立表见代理, 对方将承担全部赔偿责任。其在二审期间又援引《侵权责任法》第34条要求对方承担用人者责任, 实际上是将此作为备位请求。”[91]
上海市高级人民法院建议, “应当作出明确司法解释, 允许债权人在一审中就依次顺序提出预备性合并之诉; 同时, 在当事人提出此等请求时, 法院也有义务对此合并审理。如此, 则可通过一审程序全面认定各项法律构成要件, 避免二审重新确定争议焦点。”[92]
我们对此深表赞同, 若储户能够在一审程序中同时主张雇主替代责任和表见代理这两条救济路径, 不仅能够让储户获得全面救济的机会, 也能够一次性地解决纠纷, 减少诉累。
三、风险分配还是风险分散?
不管采纳雇主替代责任还是表见代理, 本质上都是风险分配的过程, 即储户的损失究竟应该分配于银行还是储户本身。法律规则尽其所能实现利益平衡、风险分配合理, 但是无法解决风险本身。与风险分配相适应的另外一种制度就是如何将风险定价, 由专业机构利用金融工具将风险进行分散。
例如, 我国早年有铺保制度(corporate guarantee), 即以店铺名义为他人出具证明所做的一种担保。[93]铺保的提供者通常是金融机构雇员的长辈所开设的工厂、商铺。在银行等金融机构的雇员发生故意或疏忽的对外行为时, 金融机构可要求为雇员个人作担保的工厂、商铺承担保证责任, 从而转移金融机构自身风险。现代银行主要通过购买银行业综合保险(Banker‘s Blanket Bond)解决雇员欺诈风险。
本文仅提出风险分散的思路以供讨论, 我国是否适合采纳此类制度, 有待于实践检验。
注释
[1] 有实务人士统计司法实践中解决“飞单”问题的审理思路包括表见代理、替代责任和共同侵权。从数量来看, 表见代理的思路占据主流。请见张献之: 《侵权视角下银行“飞单”的类型分析与裁判进路》, 微信公众号“至正研究”, 链接: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/IF73CAw_3s09v4aHv30EjQ。
[2] 最高人民法院: 《对<关于对金融机构适用表见代理作出特别规定的建议>的答复》, 微信公众号“华政民商”, 链接: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/FbfffKyOraFS7HJErlCuHg。
[3] 刘贵祥: 《关于金融民商事审判工作中的理念、机制和法律适用问题》, 载《法律适用》2023年第1期, 第13页。
[4] Anthony Gray, Vicarious Liability: Critique and Reform, Hart Publishing, 2021, pp. 5-6, “In tracing the historical roots of the vicarious liability doctrine, we are assisted by the work of two esteemed legal scholars, John Wigmore and Oliver Wendell Holmes, who both wrote multi-part articles discussing vicarious liability in its historical context in the Harvard Law Review in the latter years of the nineteenth century. … Holmes says that the principle of vicarious liability can be traced to both Germanic and Roman law.”
[5] John Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History – II, (1894) 7 Harvard Law Review 383, 391; cited in Paula Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort: A Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 148, “by the sixteenth century the common law of England had relieved an employer of liability for his servant’s wrong unless he had specifically commanded, or consented to, the act causing the wrong.”
[6] Waltham v. Mulgar, (1606) Moo KB 1076; 72 ER 1606, “Where a master put his servant to do an illegal act, the master shall answer for the servant if he mistakes in the doing of the act.”
[7] Anthony Gray, Vicarious Liability: Critique and Reform, Hart Publishing, 2021, p. 9, “As the size of business enterprise grew, it became less likely that a master would specifically authorize particular actions of a servant. The master and the servant were more remote from each other than was the position at the time the doctrine was first conceived.”
[8] Turberville v. Stampe, (1698) 1 Ld Raym 264; 91 ER 1072, “in this case if the defendant’s servant kindled the fir in the way of husbandry, and proper for his employment, though he had no express command of his master, yet the master shall be liable … for it shall be intended that the servant had authority from his master, it being for his master’s benefit.”
[9] Anthony Gray, Vicarious Liability: Critique and Reform, Hart Publishing, 2021, p. 10, “This passage is important for at least two reasons. First, it specifically moves away from the specific command or consent requirement, holding that a master could be liable although he did not expressly command the actions of the servant. Instead, it was enough if the servant had ‘authority’, though this concept was not explained. Secondly, Holt CJ linked the concept of authority with whatever could be characterised as ‘being for the master's benefit’. This is the first case that I can find where this concept was used as a basis for finding a master liable.”
[10] Williams v. Jones, (1865) 3 H & C 602, 612; 159 ER 668, 672, “nor was the act of lighting the pipe in any way whatever for the benefit of his master.”
[11] Stone v. Cartwright, (1795) 6 TR 411, 413; 101 ER 622, 623, “the present defendant has no interest in the colliery, nor was it worked for his benefit.”
[12] Duncan v. Findlater, (1839) 6 Cl & F 894, 910; 7 ER 934, “what he does, being done for my benefit and under my direction, I am responsible for the consequences of doing it.”
[13] Anthony Gray, Vicarious Liability: Critique and Reform, Hart Publishing, 2021, p. 26, “Obviously, the answer to this question would turn upon whether an objective or subjective view were taken of the issue of whether the employee was acting for the benefit of the employer. Would it be sufficient that the employee believed they were acting for their employer's benefit, or would it need to appear to a reasonable observer that the employee was so acting? Hence, the law eventually realised that, by itself, the concept of whether the employee was acting for the benefit or purposes of the employer was insufficient in determining vicarious liability boundaries. It had to be accompanied by something else, and that something else proved to be the ‘scope of employment’ doctrine.”
[14] Paula Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort: A Comparative Perspective, ‎Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 157, “In determining the test for course of employment at common law, the starting point has traditionally been the definition given by the textbook writers, Salmond and Heuston (the so-called Salmond test). A master is not responsible for a wrongful act done by his servant unless it is done in the course of his employment. It is deemed to be so done if it is either (1) a wrongful act authorised by his master, or (2) a wrongful and unauthorized mode of doing some act authorised by the master.”
[15] Paula Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort: A Comparative Perspective, ‎Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 160, “Whilst it is possible to conceive of negligence as an ‘unauthorised’ means of doing one’s job, it becomes extremely difficult to apply this test to include deliberate wrongdoing. … To deem serious criminal offences an ‘unauthorised mode’ of performing one’s tasks requires a distortion of the test to include acts which no reasonable employer would ever consider authorising.”
[16] Lister v. Helsey Hall Ltd, [2002] 1 AC 215 (HL), paras. 15-16.
[17] Lister v. Helsey Hall Ltd, [2002] 1 AC 215 (HL), para. 28, “The question is whether the warden's torts were so closely connected with his employment that it would be fair and just to hold the employers vicariously liable.”
[18] Alex Ching Kong Ma, Vicarious Liability and the Close Connection Test: The Past, Present, and Future, (2009) 1 City U HK L Rev 117, p. 132, “The Canadian approach is determined by whether or not the employer has enhanced the risk of wrongful act being committed, and also by determining the degree to which the employer, by placing the employee in their role, empowered the employee in a way that enhanced the risk of the wrongful act occurring.”
[19] Alex Ching Kong Ma, Vicarious Liability and the Close Connection Test: The Past, Present, and Future, (2009) 1 City U HK L Rev 117, p. 132, “The difference in the UK approach is based on the connection between the employee's wrongful conduct and the employer's duty as opposed to the Canadian approach which requires an active part of the employer in enhancing such risk of the tort being committed and the empowerment of the employee.”
[20] Paula Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort: A Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 189, 192, “the facts of the case; employee purpose; victim compensation- lie at the heart of our modern understanding of the scope of vicarious liability.”
[21] Paula Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort: A Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 174, “Lord Nicholls acknowledged in Dubai Aluminium Co. Ltd v Salaam that, realistically, uncertainty is inevitable and the onus is therefore on the court to make an evaluative judgment in each case, having regard to the particular factual circumstances and previous court decisions.”
[22] Olson v. Tri-County State Bank, 456 N.W.2d 132 (1990), p. 135, “Whether a principal will be held liable for the conduct of an agent is determined by the nexus between the agent's employment and the activity which actually caused the injury. Liability will be imposed upon the principal when the nexus is sufficient to make the resulting harm foreseeable. In other words, if the agent's employment puts him in a position where his harmful conduct would not be ‘so unusual or startling that it would be unfair to include the loss caused by the injury among the costs of the employer's business,’ then the principal is liable for the injury.”
[23] Desmond Ryan, Close Connection and Akin to Employment: Perspectives on 50 Years of Radical Developments in Vicarious Liability, (2016) 56 Irish Jurist (NS) 239, p. 244, “whether at the time of the incident the employee could reasonably be said to have been acting, however, mistakenly or excessively in the interests of the employer or was merely pursuing some private end…”
[24] Riggan v. Glass, 734 N.W.2d 486 (2007) at 3, “An act is deemed to be within the scope of one’s employment where such act is necessary to accomplish the purpose of the employment and is intended for such purpose, although in excess of the powers actually conferred on the servant by the master.”
[25] Riggan v. Glass, 734 N.W.2d 486 (2007) at 4, “we find there is sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude Glass was acting within the scope of his employment. In addition to being the CEO and president, Glass was also a loan officer in charge of the loan department. His criminal conduct-creating loans and directing where the proceeds of these loans would go-was well within his assigned duties at the bank. One of the purposes of his illegal conduct was to create the false impression that HSB had no bad loans and was extremely profitable.”
[26] Olson v. Tri-County State Bank, 456 N.W.2d 132 (1990) at 135, “A principal is not automatically discharged from liability for fraud committed by an agent simply because the agent acts solely to benefit himself.”; see also Lister v. Helsey Hall Ltd, [2002] 1 AC 215 (HL), para 17, “it finally established that vicarious liability is not necessarily defeated if the employee acted for his own benefit.”
[27] Mohamud v. WM Morrison Supermarkets plc, [2016] UKSC 11, paras. 44-45, “In the simplest terms, the court has to consider two matters. The first question is what functions or ‘field of activities’ have been entrusted by the employer to the employee, or, in everyday language, what was the nature of his job…Secondly, the court must decide whether there was sufficient connection between the position in which he was employed and his wrongful conduct to make it right for the employer to be held liable under the principle of social justice…”
[28] Paula Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort: A Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 170, “The court’s decision may also have been influenced by the fact that the off-duty officer was sitting in his own private vehicle and not in the area where he would have worked if he had been on duty when the offence took place.”
[29] Karin Calitz, The Close Connection Test for Vicarious Liability, (2007) 18 Stellenbosch L Rev 451, 463, “The fact that the employer had a duty towards the third person and had placed an employee in a position of authority to do the duty on its behalf, indicated by the wearing of uniforms, was an important factor in leading the Court to the conclusion that there was in fact a close connection.”
[30] Karin Calitz, The Close Connection Test for Vicarious Liability, (2007) 18 Stellenbosch L Rev 451, 463, “The duty to protect a weaker party (vulnerability of the victim) also seems to be one of the factors taken into consideration by the Constitutional Court in finding a close connection.”
[31] Paula Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort: A Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 175, “there is ongoing authority that a more restrictive test applies to one particular tort: that of fraud or deceit.”
[32] Paula Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort: A Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press 2010, p. 176, “Liability would therefore appear to arise not where the employee is acting in the course of employment, but within the scope of his actual or ostensible authority.”
[33] Luk Wing Yan v. CMB Wing Lung Bank Limited, [2021] HKCFI 279, para. 142, “it is the apparent authority of the employee who makes the fraudulent representations that will identify the necessary close connection as might render it just to hold the employer vicariously liable.”
[34] Paula Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort: A Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 177, “The need for a special ‘course of employment’ test is said to derive from the nature of the tort itself. Deceit (or fraudulent misrepresentation) requires that the employee makes a false representation, knowing it to be untrue, or at least being reckless as to its truth, with the intention to mislead the victim, and which causes the victim to rely upon it to his or her detriment. In determining which statements are in the ‘course of employment’, the courts will also consider the requirement of reliance by the victim and have established that only statements which can be said to be within the authority the employee possesses (actual) or may reasonably be said to possess (ostensible) may be said to be ‘closely connected’ to what the defendant was employed to do.”
[35] Clerk, J. F., and W. H. Lindsell, Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, Sweet & Maxwell, 23rd Ed. 2020, para. 6-60, “the essential feature for creating liability in the employer is that the party contracting with the fraudulent servant should have altered his position to his detriment in reliance on the belief that the servant's activities were within his authority; or, to put it another way, part of his job. Such authority may be; either actual or ostensible.” Luk Wing Yan v. CMB Wing Lung Bank Limited, [2021] HKCFI 279, para. 137, “Apparent authority is found where a principle, by words or conduct, has represented to the third party that the agent has actual authority to enter into the kind of transaction in question, and the third party enters into a transaction in reliance on that representation, which reliance must be reasonable.”
[36] Armagas Ltd v. Mundogas SA (The Ocean Frost), [1985] 3 All ER 795, “the two shipowners were aware that M had no general authority to enter into such a charter … the plaintiff was not entitled to assume, from M's position with the defendant, that it could rely on his representation that he had authority to enter into a charter which was outside his general authority and contained unusual provisions.” cited in Paula Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort: A Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 177, “The claimants had known that M did not have any general authority to enter into a three-year charterparty and, in the absence of any representation by the defendants as to his authority, the claimants could not have reasonably believed him to possess specific authority to do this.”
[37] Luk Wing Yan v. CMB Wing Lung Bank Limited, [2021] HKCFI 279, para. 142, “it is the apparent authority of the employee who makes the fraudulent representations that will identify the necessary close connection as might render it just to hold the employer vicariously liable.”
[38] Luk Wing Yan v. CMB Wing Lung Bank Limited, [2021] HKCFI 279, para. 203, “the plaintiff could not reasonably have believed that Ms Liu had the means to honour the investment arrangements, reinforcing a belief that it was the Bank with whom she dealing… (but which product was specifically not available to outsiders, as the plaintiff knew).”
[39] Lloyd v. Grace, Smith & Co, [1912] AC 716., “If an agent commits a fraud while acting or purporting to act in the course of the business which he is authorised, or held out as authorised, to transact on account of his principal, the principal, although innocent of the fraud, is liable for the fraud of the agent whether the fraud results in a benefit to the principal or not.”
[40] Harkness v. Platten, 359 Or. 715 (2016) at 715-16, “Kantor proposed that plaintiffs borrow money from Sunset, using the equity in their house as collateral, and then she would invest those proceeds in short-term, high-interest loans to developers and building contractors (hard-money loans). She told plaintiffs that those hard-money loans would be secured by first or second liens on real property with ‘lots’ of equity…Kantor had forged the documents for at least that loan…Kantor had not recorded any liens…Kantor also had been running all the money through her personal accounts.”
[41] Harkness v. Platten, 359 Or. 715 (2016) at 720, “The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that plaintiffs had not presented sufficient evidence of apparent authority to survive defendant's directed-verdict motion: 'Plaintiffs presented no evidence that Kantor had the apparent authority to give investment advice on behalf of either company, engage in the proposed investment scheme, or, for the contract claim, bind Sunset or Directors to the oral terms of that scheme.’ … The court then considered the remaining evidence and concluded that ‘[i]t was not objectively reasonable for plaintiffs to believe that that type of investment scheme [in which Kantor had engaged] was part of Kantor's job as a ‘loan officer,’ nor did Sunset or Directors provide any information to plaintiffs, whether directly or indirectly, that such a scheme or financial advice was part of Kantor's job.’”
[42] Harkness v. Platten, 359 Or. 715 (2016) at 719, “Plaintiffs' apparent authority and respondeat superior theories were ultimately based on the same argument and evidence—i.e., that Sunset and Directors had clothed Kantor with apparent authority to engage in the investment scheme with plaintiffs on behalf of the companies as part of her employment as a loan officer.”
[43] Harkness v. Platten, 359 Or. 715 (2016) at 731-732, “We conclude that plaintiffs sufficiently developed their argument on appeal that the trial court failed to determine the vicarious liability of Sunset and Directors on plaintiffs' noncontract claims, and we therefore reach that argument. Again, on review of the grant of defendant's motion for a directed verdict, we view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs' favor. … we also conclude that a factfinder could infer that the requirements for holding an employer vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior are met in this case. … This court has summarized those requirements as follows: ‘Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is liable for an employee's torts when the employee acts within the scope of employment. Negligence or other tortious conduct by the employer is not required.’”
[44] Harkness v. Platten, 359 Or. 715 (2016) at 723, “when a principal cloaks an agent with actual authority to perform certain tasks, that actual authority may create the appearance of authority to perform other, related tasks.”
[45] Harkness v. Platten, 359 Or. 715 (2016) at 730, “Absent circumstances that should raise questions in the mind of a reasonable third party, as a general matter there is no requirement that the third party inquire into the scope of an agent's authority.”
[46] Harkness v. Platten, 359 Or. 715 (2016) at 728, “Kantor was employed on a commission basis as a loan officer to originate loans…a good loan officer could tell clients to utilize the equity in their real property to make money, and that his loan officers were encouraged to go out and find business.”
[47] Wilder v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., Not Reported in Fed. Supp. (2018), “Plaintiff alleges Defendant Rutty fraudulently induced him into investing in a Ponzi scheme…in 2010, Defendant Navin Subramaniam-Xavier (‘Defendant Xavier’) was president of Essex Holdings, Inc. (‘Essex’) when he entered into an arrangement with Defendant Rutty in which he would provide him with ‘financial consideration’ in exchange for Defendant Rutty’s promotion of Essex to investors. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Rutty would ‘advise the investors to wire any investments to his attention at his Chase Bank as an inducement that Chase stood behind Essex’.”
[48] Wilder v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186778, “To prevail on a claim of vicarious liability based upon apparent agency, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the alleged principal made some sort of representation or manifestation causing a third party to believe that the alleged agent had authority to act for the benefit of the principal; (2) such belief was reasonable; and (3) the third party reasonably acted on such belief to his detriment.”
[49] Wilder v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186778, “Plaintiff's response in opposition is void of any case law supporting his arguments of vicarious liability based on the alleged apparent agency relationship between Defendant Rutty and Defendant Chase (besides the fact that Defendant Rutty was employed as a Chase ‘business specialist’ at a Chase Bank.”
[50] Wilder v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186778, “Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint fails to allege that Plaintiff's belief that Defendant Rutty had authority to act for the benefit of Chase Bank was reasonable.”
[51] Lord Keith in The Ocean Frost [1986] AC 717 commented, at 783, “that vicarious liability will not arise when the claimants’ belief ‘has been brought about through misguided reliance on the servant himself, when the servant is not authorised to do what he is purporting to do, when what he is purporting to do is not within the class of acts that an employee in his position is usually authorised to do, and when the employer has done nothing to represent that he is authorised to do it.”
[52] First Energy (UK) Ltd v. Hungarian International Bank Ltd, [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 194. See comment by F. M. B. Reynolds, The ultimate apparent authority, Law Quarterly Review, 110 (1994), 21; cited in Paula Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort: A Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 180, “although decided on the basis of contractual agency, was sceptical that claimants would query an assertion of authority by someone of considerable importance in a small organisation by seeking confirmation from head office. To expect such behaviour was to ignore commercial reality and common sense.”
[53] Paula Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort: A Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 180, “The English approach appears questionable in imposing a burden on the victim to verify an assertion of authority in these particular circumstances, and contrary to the basic principle underlying the tort of deceit that ‘Seeing somebody must be a loser, by this deceit, it is more reason that he that employs and puts a trust and confidence in the deceiver should be a loser, than a stranger.” Hern v. Nichols, (1708) 1 Salk 289, 91 ER 256 per Holt LJ.”
[54] F. Trindade, P. Cane and M. Lunney, The Law of Torts in Australia, Oxford University Press, 4th ed., 2007, 19.9.1.2.3; cited in Paula Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort: A Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 179, “it is not clear why the law should not adopt the attitude that a person is entitled to believe such an assertion of authority by a servant unless there is some good reason to be suspicious of the truth.”
[55] Luk Wing Yan v. CMB Wing Lung Bank Limited, [2021] HKCFI 279, para. 135, “The employer must, by words or conduct, have induced the impaired party’s belief that the employee was acting within his authority. Further, the claimant must show that he in fact relied upon the actual or ostensible authority with which he alleges the employer had clothed his employee.”
[56] Luk Wing Yan v. CMB Wing Lung Bank Limited, [2021] HKCFI 279, para. 13, “the court is not entitled to expect a fraud victim to make enquiries about the legitimacy of a transaction even if there are reasonable grounds for suspicion.”
[57] Ong Han Ling and another v. American International Assurance Co Ltd and others, [2017] SGHC 327, para. 165, “The AIA defendants first argue that the plaintiffs have not fulfilled the precondition for the imposition of vicarious liability, namely that the plaintiffs must be less at fault than the blameworthy party (Sally) and/or the ultimate defendant (AIA): Skandinaviska (CA) at [78]. The AIA defendants contend that the Ongs were more at fault as compared to AIA, as they did notnotice the suspicious circumstances that should have alerted them to Sally’s fraud. Accordingly, vicarious liability should not be imposed.”
[58] Ong Han Ling and another v. American International Assurance Co Ltd and others, [2017] SGHC 327, para. 166, “Its point was simply that where the victim is more at fault than the tortfeasor or defendant, the policy consideration of victim compensation as a justification for imposing vicarious liability loses much of its moral force. … So the requirement of lack of relative fault is relevant to, but not determinative of, the policy consideration of effective victim compensation, which is in turn only one of the policy considerations determining whether vicarious liability should be imposed.”
[59] Ong Han Ling and another v. American International Assurance Co Ltd and others, [2017] SGHC 327, para. 167, “In this case, I find that the Ongs were not more at fault as compared to AIA.”
[60] Ong Han Ling and another v. American International Assurance Co Ltd and others, [2017] SGHC 327, paras. 178, 181 and 182, “First, AIA’s business model afforded Sally the opportunity to abuse her functions as an insurance agent. … Second, Sally’s conduct directly led to deceiving OHL into remitting money to purchase a non-existent insurance product and the purchase of the Unauthorised Policies with the Ongs’ money, which fell squarely within AIA’s aims of selling insurance policies via agents.”
[61] Rohini D/O Balasubramaniam v. HSR International Realtors Pte Ltd, [2018] SGCA 37, para. 21, “In the present case, the Judge held, the appellant had been ‘grossly negligent’ and her loss was ‘directly attributable to her own moral culpability’ (see the GD at [34]). He further held that there was no reason to fault HSR for the appellant’s loss. The appellant had given Kelvin Yeow blank cheques despite being aware, from a Service Fee Agreement signed in respect of the purchase of the Bayshore Park Property in 2007, that she should not be giving blank cheques to HSR’s salespersons. Since it was the appellant’s own conduct that had given Kelvin Yeow the opportunity to commit the fraud, it would be unjust to impose vicarious liability on HSR for the appellant’s loss (see the GD at [35]–[36]).”
[62] Tan Cheng-Han, Authority, Vicarious Liability and Misrepresentation, Singapore Journal of Legal Studies [2012], p. 108, “In general, the carelessness of the victim is not relevant to determining the issue of vicarious liability. Such carelessness may be relevant in allowing the employer who is found to be vicariously liable in negligence to raise the issue of contributory negligence so as to reduce the damages payable.”
[63] Luk Wing Yan v. CMB Wing Lung Bank Limited, [2021] HKCFI 279, para. 142, “it is the apparent authority of the employee who makes the fraudulent representations that will identify the necessary close connection as might render it just to hold the employer vicariously liable.”
[64] 最高人民法院民法典贯彻实施工作领导小组主编: 《中华人民共和国民法典侵权责任编理解与适用》, 人民法院出版社2020年版, 第237页。不过, 也有少数观点认为, 用人单位责任属于过错推定责任。在用人单位责任中实际存在两个行为, 一个是造成损害的工作人员的行为, 另一个是用人单位监督管理不力、管理不当的行为。过错推定责任的适用, 能够从工作人员致他人损害的事实中, 推定用人单位疏于选任、监督之责的过错, 实行举证责任倒置, 由用人单位举证证明自己已尽相当的注意, 无须被侵权人举证证明而直接推定用人单位的过失, 就使被侵权人处于有利地位, 使其合法权益能够得到很好的保护。
[65] 邹海林、朱广新主编: 《民法典评注•侵权责任编(1)》, 中国法制出版社2020年版, 第299页。
[66] 贺辉、徐卫岭: 《“替代责任”价值取舍:从银行职员责任向银行责任扩张的理论解释》, 载《法律适用》2022年第6期, 第161页。
[67] 杨代雄: 《表见代理的特别构成要件》, 载《法学》2013年第2期, 第65-66页。
[68] 朱虎: 《表见代理中的被代理人可归责性》, 载《法学研究》2017年第2期, 第65页。
[69]杨芳: 《<合同法>第49条(表见代理规则)评注》, 载《法学家》2017年第6期, 第171页。
[70] 徐海燕: 《表见代理构成要件的再思考:兼顾交易安全和意思自治的平衡视角》, 载《法学论坛》2022年第3期, 第52-55页; 叶金强: 《表见代理中信赖合理的判断模式》, 载《比较法研究》2014 年第1 期, 第91-94页。
[71] 上海市第一中级人民法院(2018)沪01民终4186号民事判决书。
[72] MüKoBGB/Wagner BGB § 831 Rn. 30, “Erforderlich ist nicht bloß Kausalität, sondern ein qualifizierter, innerer Zusammenhang zwischen dem übertragenen Aufgabenkreis und der Schadenszufügung.”
[73] MüKoBGB/Wagner BGB § 831 Rn. 33, “Gerade unter der von der Rspr. gewählten Prämisse, die Geschäftsherrnhaftung erfordere einen „inneren“ Zusammenhang zwischen Verrichtung und Schädigung, muss die Zurechnung des Gehilfenverhaltens mit Hilfe teleologischer Kriterien erfolgen, die auf dem Prinzip der Risikoerhöhung beruhen.”
[74] MüKoBGB/Wagner BGB § 831 Rn. 33, “Die Auswahl, Überwachung und Anleitung der Gehilfen ist Sache des Geschäftsherrn, weil er dem Gehilfen erst die Mittel an die Hand gibt und die Gelegenheit verschafft, Rechtsgüter Dritter zu beeinträchtigen, und anders als der Geschädigte auch dazu in der Lage ist, durch sorgfältige Auswahl, Überwachung, Anleitung sowie sonstige Maßnahmen der Betriebsorganisation im Interesse der Schadensvermeidung tätig zu werden (→ Rn. 4). Folgerichtig ist dem Geschäftsherrn nicht nur das allgemeine Betriebsrisiko zuzuweisen, sondern er hat auch das Personalrisiko zu tragen, also die Gefahr, dass sich der Gehilfe als nachlässig oder böswillig erweist. Er hat für die Folgen aller Handlungen des Verrichtungsgehilfen einzustehen, die Letzterem durch die Übertragung der jeweiligen Aufgaben ermöglicht oder erleichtert wurden.”
[75] MüKoBGB/Wagner BGB § 831 Rn. 32, “wenn das deliktische Verhalten aus dem Kreis der übertragenen Aufgaben herausfällt, der Gehilfe also „rein zufällig mit den Rechtsgütern des Geschädigten in Berührung“ kommt.”
[76] MüKoBGB/Wagner BGB § 831 Rn. 32, “Bereits das RG hatte es in stRspr abgelehnt, den Halter eines Kraftfahrzeugs, der den Wagen einem Gehilfen anvertraut hatte, dafür haftbar zu machen, wenn Letzterer eine Schwarzfahrt unternahm und dabei einen Unfall verursachte, und der BGH ist dem gefolgt.”
[77] MüKoBGB/Wagner BGB § 831 Rn. 32, “Ebenso wurde eine Haftung verneint, wenn ein bei einem Fahrgeschäft auf einem Volksfest beschäftigter Gehilfe dort mit einem Kind anbandelt, es anschließend entführt und schließlich vergewaltigt.”
[78] MüKoBGB/Wagner BGB § 831 Rn. 33, “Aus dem Anwendungsbereich von § 831 heraus fallen allerdings Delikte, die der Eigensphäre des Gehilfen zuzurechnen sind, auf die der Geschäftsherr keinen Einfluss hat und die er mit Maßnahmen der innerbetrieblichen Prävention nicht zu steuern vermag.”
[79] MüKoBGB/Wagner BGB § 831 Rn. 33, “Nach diesen Kriterien ist die Haftung des Geschäftsherrn zu verneinen, wenn der Gehilfe im Rahmen der Verrichtung eine private Beziehung zu einem Kunden aufbaut, um dann außerhalb der Beschäftigung an diesem eine Straftat zu begehen.”
[80] MüKoBGB/Wagner BGB § 831 Rn. 33, “Die Mitnahme eines Passanten im Führerhaus eines Lkw unter Verstoß gegen Weisungen des Geschäftsherrn ist dessen Risikosphäre zuzurechnen, wenn nicht Fahrer und Fahrgast kollusiv zu dessen Lasten zusammenwirken, denn in einem solchen Fall weiß der Geschädigte, worauf er sich einlässt und bedarf keines Schutzes durch Begründung von Ersatzansprüchen (auch) gegen den Prinzipal.”
[81] 邹海林、朱广新主编: 《民法典评注•侵权责任编(1)》, 中国法制出版社2020年版, 第301-302页。
[82] 王利明、周友军、高圣平: 《中国侵权责任法教程》, 人民法院出版社2010年版, 第496页; 程啸: 《侵权责任法》(第三版), 法律出版社2021年版, 第465页。
[83] 最高人民法院民法典贯彻实施工作领导小组主编: 《中华人民共和国民法典侵权责任编理解与适用》, 人民法院出版社2020年版, 第239页。
[84] 邹海林、朱广新主编: 《民法典评注•侵权责任编(1)》, 中国法制出版社2020年版, 第303-304页。
[85] 程啸: 《侵权责任法》(第三版), 法律出版社2021年版, 第467页。
[86] 上海市浦东新区人民法院(2017)沪0115民初11285号民事判决书。
[87] 上海市第一中级人民法院(2018)沪01民终1049号民事判决书。
[88] 上海市高级人民法院(2018)沪民申1870号民事裁定书。
[89] 上海市第一中级人民法院(2020)沪01民再42号民事裁定书。
[90] 上海市浦东新区人民法院(2020)沪0115民初61916号民事判决书。
[91] 茆荣华主编: 《<民法典>适用与司法实务》, 法律出版社2020年版, 第78页。
[92] 茆荣华主编: 《<民法典>适用与司法实务》, 法律出版社2020年版, 第78页。