A Second Look at IDC Investigation Case in China
继中国国家发展改革委（“国家发改委”）在2013年调查和处罚了数起横向垄断协议、纵向垄断协议案件之后，滥用市场支配地位又成为中国反垄断执法机构新的执法重点。除了广东省工商行政管理局（经国家工商总局授权）于2013年12月对惠州大亚湾溢源净水有限公司涉嫌滥用市场支配地位行为做出行政处罚之外，最近国家发改委针对美国交互数字公司（“IDC公司”）做出中止调查的决定立即成为了国内外业界关注的重大事件。
Following numerous high-profile cases concluded by the National Development Reform Commission (“NDRC”) in 2013 against cartel and RPMs, abuse of market dominance has become the new focus to the Chinese antitrust agencies. Apart from the first abuse case closed by Guangdong Provincial Administration of Industry and Commerce in December 2013 against a local water supply company, NDRC’s recent decision to suspend the investigation against Inter Digital Inc of the US (“IDC”) immediately became another noteworthy headline to global business community.
IDC案件的主要进程
Compilation of the developments of IDC Case
2013年5月，国家发改委根据某中国公司的举报对IDC公司启动了反垄断调查。伴随此次调查启动， IDC公司在2013年10月刚刚在华为向其提起的与标准必要专利有关的滥用市场支配地位上诉案中被中国广东省高院判决败诉，IDC被判定需就其垄断行为赔偿华为公司经济损失费2000万元人民币。
NDRC opened an investigation against IDC in May 2013 based on a complaint made by a Chinese company. While the NDRC’s investigation was launched, IDC just lost an appellate patent-related abuse claim case made by Huawei in Guangdong Province of the PRC in October 2013, in which IDC was ordered by the PRC courts to compensate Huawei RMB 20 million for damages caused by its monopolistic misconducts.
IDC公司是一家在无线通信领域中拥有众多标准必要专利的美国公司。中国无线通信设备制造商所生产的无线通信终端产品均与IDC所持有的标准必要专利相关。在中国，IDC公司被举报滥用无线通信领域标准必要专利而涉嫌构成市场支配地位的滥用，具体行为包括：
IDC is an American company holding numerous standard essential patents in wireless telecommunication sector. All Chinese wireless telecom device manufacturers must seek IDC’s license before production. In China, IDC was complained for and suspected of alleged abuse of market dominant position through the abuse of its standard essential patents pertaining to wireless telecommunication technology, specifically:
- 向中国无线通信设备制造商，比如华为、中兴通讯等公司（“中国的专利被许可方”）设定不公平的高价许可费；
- 要求中国的专利被许可方将其所持有专利向IDC公司进行免费反许可；并且
- 强迫中国的专利被许可方接受非标准必要专利和标准必要专利的捆绑许可。
- setting unfairly high prices to Chinese telecommunication producers, such as Huawei and ZTC etc (the “Chinese Licensees”);
- requiring the Chinese Licensees to grant-back their patents freely; and
- forcing the Chinese Licensees to take standard essential patent technology plus non-standard essential patent technology.
据某媒体报道，IDC公司曾以担心公司外籍高管来华被拘留或逮捕为借口，一度拒绝来中国配合国家发改委的调查工作，但IDC公司最终于2014年1月来中国与国家发改委有关官员进行了正式会面， 并且IDC公司借此机会澄清了自己此前的立场和看法。自此之后，IDC宣称将积极配合国家发改委的反垄断调查。
As reported by the media, on the excuse of fearing its officials being detained or arrested, IDC at one point refused to come to China in response to the investigation, before finally attending a meeting with NDRC officials in January 2014, an occasion on which IDC clarified its previous stance and understanding. Since then, IDC vowed cooperation with NDRC’s investigation.
今年3月3日，根据中国《反垄断法》的相关规定，IDC公司向国家发改委提交了中止调查申请，提出了消除涉嫌垄断行为后果的具体措施，主要包括：
On March 3, 2014, IDC submitted to NDRC, pursuant to the relevant provision set out in China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, a formal application for suspension of the investigation that included proposed commitments by the Company, inter alia: - 停止所有针对中国通信设备制造商的歧视性待遇，并且不再向中国通信设备制造商收取比其他（外国）通信制造商高10倍的许可费，诸如苹果、三星和诺基亚等；
- 不将非标准必要专利与标准必要专利进行捆绑许可；
- 不要求中国通信设备制造商将专利向其进行免费反许可；以及
- 不直接寻求通过诉讼方式迫使中国通信设备制造商接受其不合理的许可条件等。
- to terminate all discriminative treatment towards telecommunication terminal manufacturers in China and not to collect the royalty charged to Chinese manufacturers that is tens of times higher than those applicable to handset producers such as Apple, Samsung and Nokia etc;
- not to commit a bundled license of standard essential patent technology and non-standard essential patent technology;
- not to require Chinese companies to grant back their patents freely; and
- not to force Chinese companies to accept unreasonable licensing conditions by way of litigation.
2014年5月22日，考虑到IDC公司提出的承诺措施能够消除涉嫌垄断行为的后果，保证中国企业公平地参与市场竞争，恢复市场竞争秩序，国家发改委依据《反垄断法》第45条的规定对IDC公司做出了中止调查的决定，同时将严格监督IDC公司切实履行承诺，如果IDC公司未履行承诺或者有其他法定情形，国家发改委将恢复调查。
On May 22, 2014, considering the commitments made by IDC would lead to an effect to eliminate the anti-competitive effects of IDC’s monopolistic practice and restore the market competition order, NDRC made an announcement that it has decided to suspend the current price-related antitrust investigation against IDC and an on-going oversight on the performance of commitments by IDC will be conducted. Where IDC cannot fully honor these commitments or in case of the existence of any circumstances as prescribed by the PRC law, the antitrust investigation will be resumed.
分析
Observation
国家发改委曾在2011年中国电信和中国联通的反垄断案中基于两家公司的整改承诺首次做出中止调查的决定，在该案中两个涉案公司均为中国电信行业的巨头。毫无疑问，IDC案件是国家发改委根据《反垄断法》第四十五条将“基于整改承诺而中止调查”的机制首次平等地适用于外国公司的第一个典型案例。
Suspension of investigation upon commitments has been firstly applied in China Telecom and China Unicom Antitrust Investigation Case in 2011, in which both infringing parties are Chinese industrial giants in telecommunication sector. By no doubt, IDC Case marks the first time that suspension of investigation upon commitments would be equally applied to a violating foreign company according to Article 45 of the PRC Anti-Monopoly Law.
尽管国家发改委对IDC案件发布的公告信息没有提及国家发改委在处理该案时采用了何种分析方法，但我们可以在广东法院审理华为诉IDC滥用市场支配地位案中看到可参考的分析方法，主要是：1）基于标准必要专利的不可替代性和排他性，每一个标准必要专利都构成了一个独立的“相关市场”；2）标准必要专利持有人在相关市场被视为具有市场支配地位；3）如专利持有人存在滥用标准必要专利的行为则构成滥用市场支配地位。
Even though the information publicly disclosed by NDRC does not reveal what analytical approach had been adopted by NDRC in IDC Case, we still could treat the analytical approach adopted by the PRC Guangdong courts in Huawei v. IDC Case as a good reference, namely: 1) each standard essential patent constitutes an independent “relevant market” because of the non-replaceable and exclusive nature of the standard essential patents; 2) such patent holders are deemed to be holding a dominant market position; and 3) abuse of “standard essential” patent by the patent holders would lead to an abuse of dominant market position.
此外，由于此次IDC反垄断调查案在国家发改委目前是采取了中止调查的决定，国家发改委今后在处理涉嫌滥用标准必要专利案件时是否会以被调查公司的“全球销售额”作为反垄断罚款的计算依据仍有待关注。 如是这样，这可能会与国家发改委在2013年处理过的反垄断调查案件略有不同。在那些过往案件里，比如典型的转售价格维持（“RPM”），国家发改委通常会以涉案公司上一年度的国内销售额为基础来计算反垄断罚款的数额。
Furthermore, given the fact that the investigation against IDC has been suspended by NDRC’s decision, it remains to be seen whether NDRC would use the investigated company’s global revenues as the basis for calculating patent-related antitrust fines, as opposed to the past common practice of NDRC in 2013, in which domestic revenues of the involved companies generally served as corporate fine calculation basis in the case of RPM violations.
显而易见，IDC案件的结案和分析方法无疑将对中国未来涉及知识产权滥用的反垄断案件处理产生深远的影响。
Admittedly, the closing and analytical approach of IDC case would have a significant impact on future IP-related abuse cases in China.
结论
Conclusion
因此，我们强烈建议那些关注市场支配地位滥用或因知识产权滥用导致反垄断风险的中外公司，密切关注中国的反垄断调查，特别是市场支配地位滥用案件的未来走向。
Companies having abuse or patent-related abuse concerns in China are strongly advised to watch out for the future development of the Chinese antitrust investigation cases related to abuse of market dominance.