近年来,由于国规际金融危机,以及相关法律、法规滞后,外资在中国矿业领域进行并购的热情逐渐冷却了下来。
由于矿业权资产(探矿权和采矿权)的转让受限制,外商对境内勘查和开采固体矿产资源的企业进行投资,多数是通过股权并购的方式来完成的。
外资并购矿业企业,其审批登记部门涉及:发展改革委核准,商务部门核准,军事部门对非军事禁区的认定,国土资源部门审批,工业和信息化部审批(对黄金开采的要求),环境保护部门的审批,安全生产监督部门审批,工商局登记,外汇管理局外汇登记等;另有划分复杂的审级权限。加上 2011 年新增加的商务部并购安全审查,整个审批过程程序繁多,缺乏相互协调和明确的指引。
并购一个企业只能做一个项目
中国外商投资企业的法律,是针对制造业企业制定的,并没有考虑到风险勘查企业成功率极低的特点,因此在执行中多有不便。比如,在外资并购过程中,申报核准的内容包括:投资的特定项目,投资总额和注册资本及其比例。收购完成后, 目标企业的投资项目、投资总额和注册资本发生变化,都要求另行报批。而风险勘查企业,若其勘查项目没有发现可供开采的矿产资源,公司就要投资于新的勘查项目。而投资并购新的项目,就得按照法律规定,再次进行申请和报批。否则,该外商投资企业资本金结汇所得人民币资金不得用于境内股权投资。对外商并购后形成的矿业企业而言,这些规定给其进一步生存和发展造成了极大障碍。
股权转让的限制
法规规定:转让探矿权,应当具备自颁发勘查许可证之日起满2年等条件;转让采矿权,应当具备矿业企业投入采矿生产满1年等条件。近几年,矿业权市场炒作过多,实际投入不足,国土资源部门试图通过严格限制矿业权的转让来限制炒作行为。为了规避这种限制,投资者多通过股权并购的方式来对矿业权持有企业进行投资。于是,又出现了某省要求在矿业权证书上加注企业法定代表人姓名的规定,限制矿业权持有人的股权变更。
将合同型合作模式复杂化
国际通行的矿业权的合同型合作模式( 简称:JV) 十分简单高效,在国外审批的环节很少。在国际矿业领域,JV模式可谓人尽皆知。这种模式的优势在于正确地假定了风险勘查的低成功率,因此在风险勘查阶段,尽量避免设立公司的复杂手续,只签订合同开展合作。这种模式,虽不是中国法规规定的典型的股权并购或资产并购,但确实是国际矿产资源投资领域最为常用的并购和投资模式。
中国也规定了所谓合同型合作勘查,但要求将合作合同报经国土资源部和商务部核准。实践中,还要求外国企业办理营业执照,并凭营业执照办理外汇账户,否则中方无法收汇和结汇。这使得此项遵循国际惯例、简单高效的JV模式,未能在中国发挥作用。再者,由于外商容易误解其为国际通用的JV模式,常不经审批就开展合作,由此造成法律风险。
是否办理开采黄金矿产批准书
黄金属于“ 国家规定实行保护性开采的特定矿种”。由于历史原因,工业和信息化部与国土资源部似乎都认定自己是金矿的“ 主管部门”。在实践中,有许多黄金开采企业成功领到了采矿许可证,但忽视了工信部的核准。而工信部则强调,企业未取得“ 开采黄金矿产批准书” 而开采黄金矿产的均为非法开采。实践中形成的客观事实是,在外资收购时,很多正在经营的黄金生产企业有采矿许可证,却未申办“ 开采黄金矿产批准书”,其合法性因此受到质疑。
地质资料的公开与获得
关于地质资料的利用和保护,《地质资料管理条例》规定了经过申请可以获得10年的保护期。对于此项保护期的取得标准,《地质资料管理条例》及其《实施办法》中都未作具体规定。而且,《地质资料管理条例》还规定:“保护期内的地质资料可以有偿利用,具体方式由利用人与地质资料汇交人协商确定。”这些做法不利于前人的勘查成果得到无偿、充分的利用。
有众多的境外投资者,通过其并购的境内矿业企业,查清了许多勘查区块的地质和资源情况,留下了有价值的参考资料。法律体制的滞后和法律障碍会导致市场缺乏吸引力,使中国失去矿业领域国际投资和技术交流的机会。
English Reading
Obstacles to the foreign acquisition of Chinese mines
In recent years, the enthusiasm of foreign investors for acquisitions in the mining sector in the PRC has cooled, due to the international financial crisis and the fact that the relevant laws are outdated.
Due to restrictions on the transfer of exploration rights and mining rights, most foreign investments in Chinese enterprises engaged in mineral exploration and exploitation take the form of equity acquisitions.
When a foreign investor wishes to acquire a mining company, the approvals and registrations required include approval from the National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Commerce; confirmation from the military authorities that the area in question is not a restricted military area; approval from the land and resources authority; approval from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (required for gold mining); approval of the environmental protection authorities; approval of the work safety authorities; registration with the State Administration for Industry and Commerce; and foreign exchange registration with the State Administration of Foreign Exchange. There is also a complex division of authority between different approval levels. All these plus the security review of foreign acquisitions, introduced by the Ministry of Commerce this year, make the approval process one long reel of red tape.
One acquisition, one project
China’s laws on foreign investment enterprises were formulated with manufacturing enterprises in mind. They do not take account of the feature that most characterizes risk exploration enterprises: their low success rate.
This causes great inconvenience in practice. For example, in the course of an acquisition by a foreign investor, the particulars to be reported for approval include the specific project in which the investment is to be made, the total amount of the investment, the registered capital and the ratio between these. If any of these items change after completion of the acquisition, a new application for approval must be made. If an exploration project fails to find exploitable mineral resources, the company involved will seek new exploration projects and must go through all the approval procedures anew. If it fails to do so, the renminbi funds derived from the conversion of its capital may not be used for investment in equity in a Chinese company.
Restrictions on equity transfers
Regulations provide that to transfer exploration rights, certain conditions must be specified, such as two years having elapsed from the date of issuance of the exploration permit. To transfer mining rights, conditions include that one year must have elapsed since the mining enterprise started production.
In recent years, speculation has been rife in the mining rights market but actual investment insufficient. The result has been that the land and resources authorities have sought to limit such speculation by putting strict restrictions on the transfer of mining rights.
In an effort to circumvent such restrictions, investors have invested in the equity of companies that own mining rights. In response, in certain provinces, efforts have been made to restrict changes to the equity ownership of companies that hold mining rights by requiring that the name of the enterprise’s legal representative be indicated on the mining rights certificate.
Complicating the model
The mining rights contractual cooperation model, which is used internationally, is simple and efficient. The approval process in most jurisdictions is simple. The model takes full account of the low success rate of risk exploration. At the risk exploration stage, the complicated procedures required to establish a company are avoided by the simple execution of a contract to collaborate.
China also permits so-called contractual cooperative exploration, but requires submission of the cooperation contract to the Ministry of Land and Resources and the Ministry of Commerce for approval. In practice, a foreign enterprise is also required to apply for a business licence and must use that licence to apply for a foreign exchange account, without which the Chinese party is unable to receive and convert foreign exchange. This prevents simple and efficient contractual cooperation in China. However, because foreign investors can easily mistake the process for the internationally accepted contractual cooperation model, they will often start cooperation without having sought approval, increasing legal risk.
Gold mining approval certificate
The mining of gold is subject to specific state protection. For historical reasons, it seems that both the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) and the Ministry of Land and Resources see themselves as the authority in charge of gold mines. In practice, many gold mining enterprises have successfully obtained a mining permit but have overlooked the need to gain approval from the MIIT. However, the MIIT has stressed that the mining of gold by an enterprise without a gold mining approval certificate is illegal. Some foreign investors have acquired gold mining enterprises which lack any such approval certificate, thus calling their lawfulness into question.
Geological information
The Geological Information Administrative Regulations specify that geological information can be accorded a period of protection of 10 years following an application. However, these Administrative Regulations and their implementing measures are both silent on the criteria for securing this period of protection. Furthermore, the Administrative Regulations specify that “geological information may be used for consideration during the period of protection, and the specific method used shall be determined through consultations between the user and the collector of the geological data”. This way of doing things is not conducive to the full and free use of the results of exploration carried out by previous parties.
Numerous foreign investors have, through the Chinese mining companies they have acquired, ascertained the geological and resource situation of many exploration blocks, leaving behind them valuable reference material. The outdated legal system and the legal obstacles have taken the shine off the market, depriving China of the opportunity for international investment and technical exchange in the mining sector.
外资在华矿业并购的法律障碍 (中英文版)
作者:徐斌来源:天达共和法律观察

近年来,由于国规际金融危机,以及相关法律、法规滞后,外资在中国矿业领域进行并购的热情逐渐冷却了下来。