美国联邦贸易委员会诉高通公司--FTC V. QUALCOMM

这裁决对美国联邦贸易委员会是一个打击。去年，联邦贸易委员会获指令要求苹果与手机制造商重新协商价值数十亿美元的专利许可。
The ruling is a blow to the Federal Trade Commission, which last year won an order requiring the company to renegotiate patent licenses worth billions of dollars with phone makers.
案件简介
Facts
高通公司是一家美国上市跨国公司，总部设在加州圣地亚哥，在特拉华州注册成立。高通创造了知识产权、半导体、软件和与无线技术相关的服务，拥有CDMA2000、TD-SCDMA和WCDMA移动通信标准的关键专利。高通已经为汽车、手表、笔记本电脑、无线上网、智能手机和其他设备开发了半导体组件或软件。
Qualcomm is an American public multinational corporation headquartered in San Diego, California, and incorporated in Delaware. It creates intellectual property, semiconductors, software, and services related to wireless technology. It owns patents critical to the CDMA2000,TD-SCDMA and WCDMA mobile communications standards. Qualcomm has developed semiconductor components or software for vehicles, watches, laptops, wi-fi, smartphones, and other devices.
联邦贸易委员会认为高通违反了《谢尔曼法》，不合理地限制交易，且非法垄断了码分多址和高级长期演进蜂窝现代芯片市场。
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) contended that Qualcomm violated the Sherman Act, by unreasonably restraining trade in, and unlawfully monopolizing, the code division multiple access (“CDMA”) and premium long-term evolution (“LTE”) cellular modern chip markets.
高通公司对现代蜂窝移动通讯系统的技术创新做出了重大贡献，包括码分多址和高级长期演进蜂窝标准。高通通过专利保护创新并从中获利，并将专利授权给原始设备制造商。高通的专利包括蜂窝标准必要专利、非蜂窝标准必要专利和非标准必要专利。因为标准必要专利权利人可以通过选择拒绝许可来阻止行业参与者实施标准，所以国际标准制定组织要求专利权利人在他们的专利被纳入标准之前承诺以“公平、合理和无歧视”条款许可他们的标准必要专利。
Qualcomm has made significant contributions to the technological innovations underlying modern cellular systems, including CDMA and LTE cellular standards. Qualcomm protects and profits from its innovations through patents, which it licenses to original equipment manufacturers (“OEM”). Qualcomm’s patents include cellular standard essential patents (“SEPs”), non-cellular SEPS, and non-SEPs. Because SEP holders could prevent industry participants from implementing a standard by selectively refusing to license, international standard-setting organizations require patent holders to commit to license their SEPs on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (“FRAND”) terms before their patents are incorporated into standards.
美国上诉法院合议庭提出了一些问题，将争议焦点（如果有的话）放在高通在有效竞争领域（码分多址和高端高级长期演进现代芯片市场）做法的影响上。
The panel of UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS framed the issues to focus on the impact, if any, of Qualcomm’s practices in the area of effective competition: the markets for CDMA and premium LTE modern chips.
美国上诉法院合议庭开始审查地方法院的结论，即根据1985年Aspen Skiing案中的判决，高通有反垄断责任，将其标准必要专利许可给现代芯片市场中的直接竞争对手。合议庭认为此案缺乏Aspen Skiing案中的必要条件，地方法院错误地认为高通负有向竞争对手提供许可的反垄断责任。且，无论高通的OEM层面许可政策多么新颖，都不违反《谢尔曼法》的反竞争行为。
The panel began by examining the district court’s conclusion that Qualcomm had an antitrust duty to license its SEPs to its direct competitors in the modern chip markets pursuant to the exception outlined in Aspen Skiing (1985). The panel held that none of the required elements for the Aspen Skiing exception were present, and the district court erred in holding that Qualcomm was under an antitrust duty to license rival chip manufacturers. The panel held that Qualcomm’s OEM-level licensing policy, however novel, was not an anticompetitive violation of the Sherman Act.
联邦贸易委员会认为即使根据Aspen Skiing案高通无需履行反垄断义务，但高通从事反竞争行为违反了《谢尔曼法》第2条规定。美国上诉法院合议庭驳回了该观点。
The panel rejected the FTC’s contention that even though Qualcomm was not subject to an antitrust duty to deal under Aspen Skiing, Qualcomm nevertheless engaged in anticompetitive conduct in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act.
合议庭认为，美国联邦贸易委员会未能充分地解释高通违反合同义务的行为本身如何削弱了其竞争对手。由于联邦贸易委员会没有在理性规则框架下承担其最初的义务，合议庭较认可高通为其OEM层面许可政策所作的有利辩护，并表示无论如何该政策似乎是合理的，并与当前的行业惯例一致。合议庭的结论是，就高通违反“公平、合理和无歧视”承诺的程度而言，相应的补救措施是合同法或侵权法。
The panel held that the FTC did not satisfactorily explain how Qualcomm’s alleged breach of its contractual commitment itself impaired the opportunities of rivals. Because the FTC did not meet its initial burden under the rule of reason framework, the panel was less critical of Qualcomm’s procompetitive justifications for its OEM-level licensing policy—which, in any case, appeared to be reasonable and consistent with current industry practice. The panel concluded that to the extent Qualcomm breached any of its FRAND commitments, the remedy for such a breach was in contract or tort law.
合议庭接着阐述了地方法院关于反竞争行为损害的主要理论，高通通过其许可使用费对竞争芯片供应商征收“反竞争性附加费”，而合议庭认为，高通的专利许可使用费和“无许可，无芯片”政策没有对竞争对手的调制解调器芯片施加反竞争附加费用。相反，高通商业模式的这些方面是“对芯片供应商中立”的，并在相关方面没有破坏竞争。合议庭进一步认为，高通与苹果的2011年和2013年协议对排除码分多址调制解调器芯片市场竞争没有实质性或实际的影响。此外，由于这些协议在多年前苹果单方面终止，因此无需禁止。
The panel next addressed the district court’s primary theory of anticompetitive harm: Qualcomm’s imposition of an “anticompetitive surcharge” on rival chip suppliers via its licensing royalty rates. The panel held that Qualcomm’s patent-licensing royalties and “no license, no chips” policy did not impose an anticompetitive surcharge on rivals’ modem chip sales. Instead, these aspects of Qualcomm’s business model were “chip-supplier neutral” and did not undermine competition in the relevant markers. The panel held further that Qualcomm’s 2011 and 2013 agreements with Apple have not had the actual or practical effect of substantially foreclosing competition in the CDMA modem chip market. Also, because these agreements were terminated years ago by Apple itself, there was nothing to be enjoined.