并购交易中的对赌协议 (中英文版)

对赌协议，即估值调整机制，源自私募股权和创业投资，但目前已经被运用于公司并购交易中；尤其在高溢价的并购交易中，更是屡见不鲜。
对赌条款存在的最主要原因是信息不对称。具体来说，当投资方拟对某一目标公司进行投资时，由于信息不对称，投资方即使委托专业机构进行详尽的尽职调查，也往往无法对融资方的情况做到充分了解。因此，为了保护自身的利益，投资方一般会在投资协议中约定一定的估值调整触发条件，一旦这些触发条件被满足，投融资双方根据约定行使估值调整权利，以弥补投资方因高估值或融资方因低估值而受到的损失。
协议要素
对赌协议一般发生在投资方与目标公司、目标公司的股东、实际控制人之间。选择适当的主体，是对赌协议具备法律效力的关键。为了保证对赌协议合法，与投资方签署对赌协议的另一方主体应当是目标公司的大股东和实际控制人，而不应是目标公司本身。
关于协议的内容，在中国比较常见的是对财务绩效和股票发行进行对赌。财务绩效对赌是股权投资中最常用的对赌，即在对赌协议中约定目标公司未来一段时间的财务绩效指标（如净利润、复合增长率等），如果绩效未达标，则需要目标公司、目标公司原股东和 / 或实际控制人进行补偿，反之亦然。补偿的形式多为支付现金或股权。
股票发行对赌即对目标公司能够在未来一定期限内上市进行对赌。如果目标公司在约定的期限内未能上市，则投资方有权要求原股东回购股份，回购金额的计算一般为：投资款 + 投资款 × 投资期 × 银行贷款同期利率。如果上市成功，对赌条款自动失效。
司法认可
在海富公司与甘肃世恒及香港迪亚增资纠纷一案中，海富公司向甘肃世恒公司增资 2000 万元，持有甘 肃 世恒 3.85%股权。若甘肃世恒 2008 年净利润不足3000 万元，海富公司有权要求甘肃世恒公司予以补偿。如果甘肃世恒公司未能履行补偿义务，海富公司有权要求香港迪亚公司履行义务。
最高人民法院认定海富公司与甘肃世恒之间的对赌约定无效，理由是投资方与目标公司之间的对赌协议“使得海富公司的投资可以取得相对固定的收益，该收益脱离了世恒公司的经营业绩，损害了公司利益和公司债权人的利益”。与此同时，最高人民法院还认定“香港迪亚公司对海富公司的补偿承诺不损害公司及公司债权人的利益，不违反法律法规的禁止性规定，是当事人的真实意思表示，是有效的”，即投资人与目标公司股东之间的业绩补偿承诺合法有效。
法律在评价对赌行为时应该更多去关注双方交易过程的正义性
上海瑞沨公司与连云港鼎发公司、朱立起股权转让纠纷一案中，各方在《增资协议》及补充协议中约定：上海瑞沨公司出资3000 万元，持有目标公司 5.64% 股份；如果目标公司未能于 2013 年 12 月 31日前成功上市，上海瑞沨公司有权要求朱立起、连云港鼎发以现金形式回购其所持的全部或部分股权。负责审理此案的上海市第一中级人民法院最终根据鼓励交易、尊重当事人意思自治、维护公共利益、保障商事交易的过程正义等原则，判定上海瑞沨公司与连云港鼎发、朱立起之间的回购条款有效。
从上述案例可以看出，投资方与目标公司股东之间的对赌协议，不论是业绩对赌还是上市对赌，目前都已获得了人民法院生效判决的认可。笔者非常钦佩人民法院尊重股东自治、尊重市场在资源配置中作用的理念，赞同法院以一般合同效力的认定标准评价投资方与目标公司股东及实际控制人之间对赌协议的做法。
关于对赌协议的思考
有人认为对赌协议是资本的傲慢，是金融大鳄对创业者实施的华尔街式的掠夺。但是笔者认为，与传统民事主体比较，商事主体具有更强大的交易能力、信息获取能力以及更精准的专业判断能力。
现任北京大学教授的蒋大兴在其著作中指出，法律应当给予商事主体的是机会平等的保护以及保护的平等，而不是保证某一特定交易中的各方享有等同收益。因此，法律在评价对赌行为时应该更多去关注双方交易过程的正义性，而非对赌博弈的结果。
由于对赌博弈的最终结果确定完全取决于双方当事人的风险偏好和商业博弈。根据风险自担的原则，只要当事人意思表示真实，不存在违反法律、行政法规的情况，这种投资方与目标公司之间的对赌就应当是有效的。（此文发表在《商法》2015年8月刊上。）
English Reading
Using valuation adjustment mechanisms in M&A deals
Valuation adjustment mechanisms, or VAM agreements, have been employed in mergers and acquisition deals. VAM agreements were first used in private equity and venture capital, and have been most commonly used in M&A transactions with large premiums.
VAM agreements are principally used in these translations because of the asymmetrical state of information. Specifically, when making a proposal to a target company, the investor usually fail to fully understand the financier’s situation due to this asymmetry, even where the investor has engaged professional services to conduct due diligence into the company.
In their investment agreement, an investor will set out the value adjustment triggering conditions in order to protect their interests. Once these conditions are met, both the investor and the financier exercise their rights to adjust value based on mutual agreement to pay the damages, either to the investor due to high valuation or to financiers due to low valuation.
The meat of an agreement
Choosing a proper entity is key to securing the validity of an agreement. VAM agreements generally are between an investor and a target company, its shareholders or its actual controller(s). To ensure the agreement’s legality, the other party should not be the target company itself but its major shareholders or actual controller(s). Common practice in China is to employ a value adjustment mechanism on the financial performance or share offering of a target company.
In practice, VAM agreements that have been used most widely in equity investment are those on financial performance. In these, the financial performance of the target company (e.g. net profits, compound annual growth rate) is specified for a period in the future. If the financial performance falls short, the target company and its original shareholders or actual controllers should compensate, and vice versa. Compensation is fulfilled in cash or equity.
VAM on share offerings focuses on whether the target company can be listed in a specified period of time. If the target company fails to do so, investors are entitled to repurchase shares from the original shareholders. The formula for calculating the value of repurchased shares is set out below:
Investment value + (investment value × investment term × bankloan interest rate during that term)
The VAM agreement automatically becomes invalid when the target companygoes public.
Judicial acknowledgement
The Supreme People’s Court heard a capital increase dispute between Suzhou Industrial Park Haifu Investment and Gansu Shiheng Nonferrous Metals Recycling and Hong Kong Diya. In the dispute, Haifu increased capital in Shiheng by RMB 20 million (US$3.2 million), giving Haifu a 3.85% stake. Per their agreement, if the net income of Shiheng failed to reach RMB 30 million in 2008, Haifu would be entitled to claim compensation. If Shiheng failed to compensate, Haifu would be entitled to demand that Diya fulfil Haifu’s obligated compensation.
The Supreme People’s Court determined that the VAM agreement between Haifu and Shiheng was invalid on the grounds that the agreement “enabled Haifu to obtain relatively fixed profit from its investment, which deviates from Shiheng’s operational efficiency and impairs the interests of the target company and its creditors”.
The court also determined that “Diya’s compensation commitment toward Haifu is valid and an authentic declaration of the wills of the parties; it neither damaged the interests of the target company and its creditors nor did it violate the prohibition stipulated in laws and regulations”. Thus the performance compensation commitment between investors and the target company’s shareholders is legally valid.
In the equity transfer dispute between Shanghai Ruifeng, Lianyungang Dingfa and Zhu Liqi heard by Shanghai Municipal No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court, the parties specified in their capital increase agreement and supplemental agreements that Ruifeng would invest RMB 30 million and hold a 5.64% stake; if the target company failed to be listed by 31 December 2013, then Ruifeng would be entitled to repurchase in cash all or part of the shares held by Zhu Liqi and Dingfa.
When evaluating VAMs, the law should pay closer attention whether parties’ transactions are just
The court found that the repurchase agreement between Ruifeng, Dingfa and Zhu Liqi was valid. The court held that the law encourages transactions, respects party autonomy, maintains public interests and secures the procedural justice of commercial transactions.
These cases demonstrate that courts have acknowledged VAM agreements between investors and shareholders of target companies in either financial performance or share-offering. The courts’ view that the law respects shareholder autonomy and the role of markets in disputing resources is admirable. Their recognition of VAM agreements between investors, shareholders and actual controllers of a target company, based on the determination standards of general validity, should be lauded as well.
Some considerations
There is an opinion that the VAM agreement is an embodiment of the arrogance of capital, a Wall Street-esque plundering of start-up entrepreneurs by financial giants. The authors, however, would hold that, in contrast with traditional civil entities, commercial entities have stronger transactional ability, greater information access and more pertinent capacity for professional judgment.
Peking University professor Jiang Daxing has stated that the law should offer commercial parties equal opportunities for protection as well as equality in protection, rather than securing all parties to enjoy equal profits within a certain transaction. Therefore, he said, when evaluating VAMs, the law should pay closer attention to whether the parties’ transactions are just, rather than simply what results from gambles on VAM.
It is noted that what results from VAM is wholly dependent on both parties’ risk preferences and how they play the game of commerce. Per the principle that holds that parties should shoulder their own risks, VAM agreements between investors and target companies should be deemed as valid if they reflect the genuine will of the parties and do not violate any law or administrative regulation. （This article has been published on China Business Law August，2015. ）